



# Scottish Police Federation

5 Woodside Place Glasgow G3 7QF

## JCC Circular 4 of 2016

Ref: CS/LS

25 January 2017

Attachments: HMICS Report

Dear Colleague

### **HMICS Independent Assurance Review Police Scotland - Call Handling - Update Report - Information**

I refer to the above and attach herewith the Report for your information.

Whilst this circular is primarily for your information only, any comments you may have on its content should be sent to me no later than 10 days after its date of publication.

Yours sincerely

**Calum Steele**  
General Secretary


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HM INSPECTORATE OF CONSTABULARY IN SCOTLAND

# **Independent Assurance Review Police Scotland – Call Handling Update Report**

January 2017

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A report of an inquiry directed by Scottish Ministers under section 74(1) of the Police and Fire Reform (Scotland) Act 2012 and laid before the Scottish Parliament under section 78(3) of that Act

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# HM Inspector of Constabulary in Scotland

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HM Inspectorate for Constabulary in Scotland (HMICS) is established under the Police and Fire Reform (Scotland) Act 2012 and has wide ranging powers to look into the 'state, effectiveness and efficiency' of both the Police Service of Scotland (Police Scotland) and the Scottish Police Authority (SPA).<sup>1</sup>

We have a statutory duty to enquire into the arrangements made by the Chief Constable and the SPA to meet their obligations in terms of best value and continuous improvement. If necessary, we can be directed by Scottish Ministers to look into anything relating to the SPA or Police Scotland as they consider appropriate. We also have an established role in providing professional advice and guidance on policing in Scotland.

- Our powers allow us to do anything we consider necessary or expedient for the purposes of, or in connection with, the carrying out of our functions.
- The SPA and the Chief Constable must provide us with such assistance and co-operation as we may require to enable us to carry out our functions.
- When we publish a report, the SPA and the Chief Constable must also consider what we have found and take such measures, if any, as they think fit.
- Where our report identifies that the SPA or Police Scotland is not efficient or effective (or best value not secured), or will, unless remedial measures are taken, cease to be efficient or effective, Scottish Ministers may direct the SPA to take such measures as may be required. The SPA must comply with any direction given.
- Where we make recommendations, we will follow them up and report publicly on progress.
- We will identify good practice that can be applied across Scotland.
- We work with other inspectorates and agencies across the public sector and co-ordinate our activities to reduce the burden of inspection and avoid unnecessary duplication.
- We aim to add value and strengthen public confidence in Scottish policing and will do this through independent scrutiny and objective, evidence-led reporting about what we find.

Our approach is to support Police Scotland and the SPA to deliver services that are high quality, continually improving, effective and responsive to local needs.<sup>2</sup>

**Although this update report follows an inquiry directed by Scottish Ministers, it was conducted under section 74(2) of the Police and Fire Reform (Scotland) Act 2012 and laid before the Scottish Parliament under section 79(3) of that Act.**

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<sup>1</sup> Chapter 11, Police and Fire Reform (Scotland) Act 2012.

<sup>2</sup> HMICS, [Corporate Strategy 2014-17](#) (2014).



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## Our assurance work

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**This report provides an update on the progress made by Police Scotland and the Scottish Police Authority in response to the HMICS Independent Assurance Review of Police Scotland's Call Handling published in 2015.**

The background to the assurance review, the objectives and methodology are outlined within the Terms of Reference,<sup>3</sup> which were published on 22 July 2015. I provided Scottish Ministers with an Interim Report,<sup>4</sup> which was published on 3 September 2015 and my Final Report<sup>5</sup> was provided to the Cabinet Secretary for Justice and published on 10 November 2015. My Final Report identified 30 recommendations for improvement which were fully accepted by Police Scotland and the SPA.

The assurance review was directed by the Cabinet Secretary for Justice following the tragic incident involving the deaths of John Yuill and Lamara Bell and sat alongside the independent investigation directed by the Lord Advocate and conducted by the Police Investigations and Review Commissioner (PIRC) into that specific incident.<sup>6</sup> The PIRC inquiry has since reported to the Lord Advocate. The HMICS review did not examine the circumstances of this incident, but provided wider independent assurance of the operation, systems and processes in place within police Contact, Command and Control (C3) facilities across Scotland.

Following the publication of the Final Report, the Cabinet Secretary provided an update to the Scottish Parliament followed by a letter requesting that HMICS continue to undertake a programme of ongoing assurance work, monitoring progress and risk levels within Police Scotland's call handling and make unannounced visits to Police Scotland's call handling facilities.<sup>7</sup> This assurance has been taking place over the past 12 months and has included over 50 visits to call handling facilities across Scotland, as well as other scrutiny activity.

I have also made an ongoing assessment of the progress made against my recommendations where evidence has been submitted for their discharge by Police Scotland and the SPA. Overall progress has been good with a total of 16 recommendations now fully discharged and 12 recommendations partly discharged. Although there are several areas which could have progressed more quickly. Only two recommendations remain outstanding.

Appendix 1 provides a more detailed summary for each recommendation and highlights the remaining improvement that HMICS requires from both Police Scotland and the SPA. Improvements achieved to date include:

- C3 staff continue to be strongly committed to providing a good service to the public and have maintained a high level of engagement with management throughout a period of intensive change and development.

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<sup>3</sup> HMICS, *Police Scotland – Call Handling: Terms of Reference for HMICS Assurance Review* (2015).

<sup>4</sup> HMICS, *Independent Assurance Review: Police Scotland – Call Handling Interim Report* (2015).

<sup>5</sup> HMICS, *Independent Assurance review: Police Scotland – Call Handling Final Report* (2015).

<sup>6</sup> PIRC, *PIRC investigation: death of couple following recovery of car at Bannockburn on 8 July 2015*.

<sup>7</sup> Statement by the Cabinet Secretary for Justice to the Scottish Parliament, SP OR 10 November 2015, col 10.

- The service the public receive has improved with 999 'grade of service'<sup>8</sup> performance now consistently high at 93% to 97% and 101 'grade of service' ranging from 91% to 100%.
- Police Scotland and the SPA have committed to building improved call handling facilities that focus on customer service, identifying risk and vulnerability and making best use of resources to effectively manage demand.
- Governance and programme management have improved significantly, with the required level of change management and quality assurance processes now in place to support the next major steps of the Contact, Command and Control Integration and Remodelling (C3IR) change programme.
- ICT systems are now stabilised, with improvements in network infrastructure and the implementation of new technologies. These include a single command and control system and enhanced customer relationship management (CRM) system. Business Continuity planning also remains strong.
- A validated workforce planning model is in place to accurately inform staffing levels to meet demand. This includes a staffing model to support the remaining C3IR change programme along with a consistent national approach to training of new staff.
- Standardised call handling processes are being developed and implemented, although this work requires to continue apace with greater emphasis on national consistency.
- A revised performance management framework has been developed, shifting the over reliance on previous 'grade of service' measures to a more balanced set of indicators.

As stated in my original report, HMICS remains supportive of the overall strategic direction for call handling being pursued by SPA and Police Scotland and welcomes the plans to retain functions in Inverness and limited functions in Aberdeen. This reflects an ongoing commitment by Police Scotland to refine its model of operations and I acknowledge that our review has been undertaken whilst wider transformational change continues to be pursued on a national level. The complexity and challenge of such change is recognised.


As in my original report, I would again emphasise that there will always be a level of risk which must be managed in the operation of police call handling. There have been a number of significant or notable incidents which have been recorded and attracted media attention over the past year. Significant incidents have been reported to the PIRC where these were appropriate. These incidents have all been used to inform improvement and promote learning in the division. Whilst this confirms my assessment that improvements still need to be made, the reality is that, as within any human system, risk cannot be wholly negated. Police Scotland continues to improve processes to mitigate against these risks.

HMICS would like to thank Police Scotland and the Scottish Police Authority for their ongoing co-operation and support during our assurance work. This work was led within HMICS by Tina Yule. Executive lead was provided personally by Derek Penman, HM Chief Inspector of Constabulary in Scotland.

I remain committed to the improvement of policing across Scotland and supporting the service to further develop. I will continue to undertake the ongoing assurance work

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<sup>8</sup> Grade of service is the percentage of calls answered within 10 seconds (for 999 calls) or 40 seconds (for 101 calls). Targets of 90% were set prior to Police Scotland by ACPO(S).



requested by the Cabinet Secretary for Justice and offer further improvement advice on call handling to the SPA and Police Scotland.

**Derek Penman QPM**

HM Chief Inspector of Constabulary in Scotland

January 2017



## Key findings

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- Of the 30 recommendations made in the final Assurance Review Report, 16 are now fully discharged, 12 are partially discharged and only 2 remain open. Considerable progress has been made.
- C3 Division have successfully delivered a number of key milestones<sup>9</sup> including implementation of a virtualised Police Scotland Service Centre (PSSC), upgrade of key ICT systems, transfer of call handling from Dundee and are on track for completion of Aberdeen and Inverness.

## Outcomes

- Latest C3 performance reports show improved performance in the East and West. 999 'grade of service'<sup>10</sup> performance is consistently high. Similarly, performance for 101 calls is now in the range of 91% to 100%. Performance in the North is much improved and reaching East/West levels. BT<sup>11</sup> has not highlighted any issues to Police Scotland in terms of 999 response levels.
- There was a 15% reduction in 999 calls and a 32% reduction in 101 calls in 2015-16 when compared with the previous year. This overall reduction in call volumes has been attributed in part by Police Scotland to its work on reducing failure demand.
- As a proportion of calls overall, the level of discontinued calls has reduced from 3.6% in 2013-14 to 2.4% in 2016-17. These are monitored on a regular basis and levels are expected to further reduce with the implementation of the virtualised PSSC in November 2016.
- A benchmarking programme has been undertaken with 'best practice' forces in England and Wales and an Expert Reference Group has been established to support ongoing improvement in call handling.
- The development of a revised performance management framework has continued over the past year. Work is still ongoing on the development of more qualitative measures. New user satisfaction measures are showing results in excess of 94% for the first two quarters of 2016-2017.
- A new benefits realisation plan and set of measures have been developed and improvements have been made in financial management.

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<sup>9</sup> In our Final Report, we referred to Stages 1-7 of the original project, which have since been revised and approved as a new phased programme with updated milestones to deliver the C3IR programme.

<sup>10</sup> Grade of service is the percentage of calls answered within 10 seconds (for 999 calls) or 40 seconds (for 101 calls). Targets of 90% were set prior to Police Scotland by ACPO(S).

<sup>11</sup> The contract for 999 services is maintained by the UK Government and is currently let to BT. Level 3 currently provides the 999 service for the rail network.

## Leadership and governance

- C3 Division has continued to progress stabilisation of its operations, through ICT system and network upgrades, process standardisation and the implementation of the PSSC.
- The required level of change management and quality assurance were in place for the establishment of the PSSC and transfer of call handling functions from Dundee.
- The SPA C3 Governance and Assurance Group (GAAG), led by members of the SPA Board, was established in early 2016 and has proved to be an effective forum for more detailed scrutiny of the Contact, Command and Control Integration and Remodelling (C3IR) change programme.
- Changes in senior management and leadership approach, and increased direction from Force Executive level, over the past year have resulted in strengthened cohesion of the C3 management team and a renewed focus on staff engagement.
- There is now clarity between the management of the C3IR change programme and the management of 'business as usual' (BAU) within the division.
- An experienced and qualified C3 Programme Manager was appointed and took up post on 1 May 2016. A comprehensive approach to the planning and commissioning of programme and project assurance is now in place.
- Risk management has improved and a new benefits framework is now in place to measure a set of revised benefits of the new C3 model.
- The recommended review of Police Scotland's use of Gold Groups has not yet been completed.

## People

- C3 staff continue to be strongly committed to providing a good service to the public and have maintained a high level of engagement with management throughout a period of intensive change and development.
- Staffing levels have improved and planned recruitment has continued to ensure that demand is met. A new workforce planning model, based on realistic evidence-based assumptions, and which has been independently validated, has now been approved.
- C3 management has made significant efforts to engage staff in how change is managed and provide reassurance, however anxiety remains amongst staff regarding the change process. Many have raised the wider organisational issue of harmonisation of terms and conditions, as having a direct impact on their morale.
- No untrained officers are being used to supplement either service centre or Area Control Room (ACR) functions.
- C3 staffing challenges remain in the North, where interim arrangements are in place pending the transfer of functions. Staff in the North remain concerned that they will not have access to the current voluntary redundancy or early retirement scheme, and that any new approved scheme may be less attractive.

- A new training strategy and flexible training delivery plan have been put in place. Training is now consistent across all locations. However, the delivery plan requires further development and to be effectively resourced.
- C3 absence rates have continued their downward trend, but remain higher than force average figures. This is reflective of a service centre environment where typically levels will exceed organisational averages.

## Resources

- Police Scotland has invested in upgrading network infrastructure, ICT resilience and the CRM system. This, and the way change has been managed, has improved performance, impacting positively on staff morale and contributing to the improved stability of C3 overall.
- A system of numbered notebook issue has been implemented with user guidance and supervision, and is in operation within all centres to replace the use of ad-hoc 'scribble pads', which had previously been identified by HMICS as a risk.
- Business Continuity Planning (BCP) across C3 sites has been tested regularly and all plans have now been updated and validated.
- C3 Division has continued to introduce improvements to the current address 'look up' gazetteer and internal directory. Service Advisors have had training and awareness sessions and been provided with detailed information toolkits for reference to support their ongoing development of local knowledge.
- The C3 approach to the auditing of information standards and quality is not currently providing the necessary levels of assurance required.
- The planned procurement and implementation of an integrated suite of new technologies (formerly Stage 7 of the original project) was postponed in late 2015. However, upgrade of the Integrated Communication Control System (ICCS)<sup>12</sup> and telephony platform are still required.
- Current savings projections have reduced from those originally forecast as a consequence of the revised staffing model and increases required to implement the PSSC and ACRs.

## Planning and process

- C3 Division has continued to develop consistent processes but further work is required with a clear presumption towards developing standardised national processes. A new simplified single standard operating procedure (SOP) is also in development. These areas require to progress faster.
- A new risk and vulnerability training package has been introduced which has been delivered to all service centre staff.

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<sup>12</sup> An Integrated Communication Control System (ICCS) provides the voice and data communications is the technology which provides a single touchscreen control to a host of integrated subsystems including radio systems, call handling systems, digital and analogue telephony, CCTV, voice recorders, intercom systems, door locks and alarms.

- The grading and prioritisation of incidents and appropriate dispatch of police officers continues to work well for emergency and high priority calls. HMICS has identified that there remains a degree of failure demand related to lower priority calls caused by a range of factors including a lack of available officers to attend incidents in some locations, repeated failures to attend scheduled appointments and failure to update callers on the status of their call.
- The business case for establishing a permanent quality assurance unit has recently been approved. However, a 'business as usual' quality framework has yet to be implemented. HMICS was clear that this was a priority and notes that this area remains under-developed.
- A new standardised 'notable incidents' process has been introduced, which when considered alongside analysis of risk, complaints and other improvement areas, provides an enhanced approach to learning across the division.
- There remains a significant variation in the role and resourcing of Public Assistance Desks (PADs) across the country.
- A Service Overview function is being established in the North, to complement those already established in the East and West.
- A national approach to Major Incident plans, converting existing major incident and emergency response plans into a single format on the national command and control system (STORM Unity), has been established. This will ensure that the policing response to a wide range of incident types is consistent across the country.
- The National Database Enquiry Unit (NDEU) will be located in Inverness and is due to be implemented in June 2017. The PNC Unit in Govan will be retained and provide resilience.

## Partnerships

- Police Scotland has been working with partners to improve assessment of risk and vulnerability and to develop joint approaches to community triage to deal more effectively with mental health and distress.
- There has been enhanced collaboration between Police Scotland and the Scottish Ambulance Service (SAS) with a triage desk within the police ACR at Bilston piloted in Easter 2016 and used again for the festive period.
- There remains a wider expectation that Police Scotland, along with its blue light partners in Scotland, will explore further opportunities for shared services.
- Decisions made by local authorities and other partner agencies to reduce or remove resources has been seen to have an impact on the demand for police services.

# Context


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## Background

1. The majority of public contact with the police is by telephone through police Contact, Command and Control (C3) centres. These centres receive approximately 500,000 emergency (999) calls and 2,600,000 non-emergency (101) calls each year.
2. C3 is a national division and is led by a Chief Superintendent as the divisional commander. An Assistant Chief Constable (ACC) has oversight of the division and is responsible for the national functions of public protection, safer communities and contact, command and control, which support local policing. The ACC reports directly to the Deputy Chief Constable (DCC) for Crime and Operational Support.
3. Throughout this report, we will use a number of terms which describe the core functions of C3:
  - Service centre: Where calls are received from the public using either 101 or 999. These centres are typically staffed by civilian service advisors. Calls are assessed and decisions are made as to what type of police response is required.
  - Police Scotland Service Centre (PSSC): Integrated call handling across a number of different sites, in effect acting as a virtual single service centre for Police Scotland receiving 101 and 999 calls from anywhere across Scotland.
  - Area Control Room (ACR): Receives incidents from the service centre and is responsible for the command and control of those incidents which involves dispatching officers on a priority basis to calls and locations and dynamically assessing risk.
  - National Database Enquiry Unit (NDEU): This service provides Police National Computer (PNC) and other database checks to the service.
4. Prior to the establishment of Police Scotland on 1 April 2013, all eight legacy forces operated contact, command and control centres. As part of police reform, C3 has undergone and is still undergoing a significant change programme. The new C3 model is currently being implemented and at completion in June 2017 will consist of:
  - *Police Scotland Service Centre* – Govan, Motherwell and Bilston Glen
  - *West Command Area Control* – Govan and Motherwell combined
  - *East Command Area Control* – Bilston Glen
  - *North Command Area Control* – Dundee
  - *National Database Enquiry Unit* – Inverness and Govan

## What has changed?

5. Since the publication of our Final Report in November 2015, there have been a number of significant changes within the wider policing environment in which C3 operates. These include the appointment of a new Chief Constable and a new senior management structure including changes in Chief Officer portfolios. A new Deputy Chief Constable (DCC) for Crime and Operational Support, Assistant Chief Constable (ACC) for Service and Protection and a new Divisional Commander (Chief Superintendent) have all been appointed in the past year and have direct responsibility



for C3. Changes in leadership style and direction from Force Executive level have impacted positively on C3 and the approach being taken by Police Scotland. This is driving improvement and delivering a new national call handling service focused on customer service, identifying vulnerability and better managing demand.

6. On appointment, the new ACC as Senior Responsible Owner (SRO) for the C3IR change programme initiated a review of the planned timetable, resulting in a revised set of milestones being approved by the SPA in August 2016. The revised timetable delayed the transfer of functions for Dundee (from June to November 2016), Aberdeen (from October 2015 to March 2017) and Inverness (from August 2016 to June 2017); and was informed by a more robust approach to quality assurance and planning. Although staff were naturally concerned about further delays, the new timescales have proven to be more realistic with a number of important milestones already achieved. Police Scotland have successfully implemented a virtualised PSSC, upgraded key ICT systems, transferred call handling from Dundee (formerly known as Stages 2 and 3 of the original project) and are on track for completion of Aberdeen and Inverness (stages 5 and 6).

## Financial challenges

7. Police Scotland, along with most other public bodies, continues to face financial challenges, both in meeting new pressures as well as the savings targets set out in the original outline business case for police reform.<sup>13</sup> C3 Division has continued to deliver a range of benefits including some financial savings to date, mainly associated with the transfer of functions from the North. HMICS notes that savings realised in 2015-16 and 2016-17 are reduced from those originally forecast. This is a result of revisions to the timetable and the revised staffing model which increases staffing levels from those originally estimated to implement the PSSC and ACRs. C3 will however continue to play a key part in the future management of demand for police services and be expected to deliver or facilitate reduction in overall costs.

## 2026 – a future vision for policing in Scotland

8. The Scottish Government launched the new Policing Priorities in October 2016<sup>14</sup> and these will be taken forward in the new Strategic Policing Plan and Annual Policing Plan from April 2017. The SPA and Police Scotland are jointly developing a new medium to long term vision for policing and plan to engage the public on ‘2026 – a future vision for policing in Scotland’. This will set out the future direction for the service and will require to be supported by a robust and properly costed transformation programme.
9. This will inevitably impact on the future direction of call handling and key areas such as risk and vulnerability, managing demand, customer contact standards and resolution at first point of contact, are likely to feature highly in any delivery programme. These were previously included as HMICS recommendations for C3. However, it is clear that these cannot now be delivered in isolation by C3 and must be taken forward corporately by Police Scotland.

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<sup>13</sup> Scottish Government, [Police reform: outline business case](#) (September 2011).

<sup>14</sup> Scottish Government, [Strategic Police Priorities for Scotland](#) (October 2016).



## SPA Chair's Governance Review

10. The current Chair of the SPA Board was appointed in September 2015. At that point, the Cabinet Secretary for Justice commissioned him to deliver a Review of Governance by March 2016. This Review was published on 23 March 2016 and the Scottish Government formally responded to the Review in June 2016 generally welcoming the approach.
11. The Governance Review is currently being implemented and the new structures and processes will impact directly on the future governance of major change programmes and projects, including ICT. Many lessons have been learnt from the experiences of both call handling and i6<sup>15</sup> and HMICS is keen to ensure that these are embedded in future governance and assurance approaches. HMICS has committed to a statutory inspection of the SPA during 2017-18 and will focus on the new governance arrangements and the SPA's oversight of transformational change, financial sustainability, people, audit and the new policing committee.

## C3 and future plans

12. Although Police Scotland and the SPA were established in April 2013, most change to date has focussed on consolidation and operational stability. Actual transformation of the service is only now being planned and will take some considerable time to deliver. This is critical to provide a sustainable policing model that addresses both the ongoing financial challenges and the major societal changes that are impacting on the demand for policing services.
13. C3 will have a major part to play in these changes, being the primary point of contact for the public. However in the meantime it should continue to focus on delivering the current C3IR change programme and pursuing stability of its operating model. This does not mean that planning for a new future state should be postponed. Indeed, HMICS would encourage proactive planning and greater innovation within C3, provided this aligns with the new and emerging strategic direction of policing. This will be particularly relevant in terms of managing demand and creating capacity elsewhere in the service to meet future challenges.

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<sup>15</sup> i6 was the planned integrated national police ICT system. It was cancelled in 2016. It planned to include six key policing areas, representing approximately 80% of core service delivery and included crime, criminal justice, custody, missing persons, vulnerable persons and productions/lost and found property.



## Progress against our recommendations

### Outcomes

14. The Outcomes section of our Final Report included recommendations 1 to 4.
15. In our Final Report we noted that call handling performance had stabilised, although at that time 101 call answering was significantly poorer in the North, than in the East or West.
16. Since November 2015, performance has continued to stabilise and improve. Call volumes have continued to fall through improved management of the use of 999 and 101.

Table 1 – Police Scotland 999 and 101 statistics

|  | 2013-14        | 2014-15           | 2015-16       | 2016-17 YTD <sup>16</sup> |
|--|----------------|-------------------|---------------|---------------------------|
| <b>Total 999 calls received<sup>17</sup></b> | 512,859        | 500,306           | 422,988       | 271,041                   |
| <b>Total 101 calls received<sup>18</sup></b> | 3,321,390      | 3,168,181         | 2,154,871     | 1,311,673                 |
| <b>Incidents recorded<sup>19</sup></b>       | 1,732,302      | 1,653,314         | 1,620,429     | 867,276                   |
| <b>Crimes recorded<sup>20</sup></b>          | 771,277        | 633,942           | 585,436       | 323,353                   |
| <b>Discontinued calls (% of total)</b>       | 139,057 (3.6%) | N/A <sup>21</sup> | 73,058 (2.8%) | 38,313 (2.4%)             |

17. Latest C3 performance reports show improved performance in the East and West. 999 'grade of service'<sup>22</sup> performance is consistently high. Similarly, performance for 101 calls is now in the range of 91% to 100%. Performance in the North is much improved and reaching East/West levels. HMICS notes that this assessment is made on the basis of grade of service measures, which although providing accurate information on the time taken to answer calls, do not fully reflect all aspects of service performance.

<sup>16</sup> YTD period is 1 April 2016 to 31 October 2016.

<sup>17</sup> Police Scotland unable to provide North Data available for April 2015.

<sup>18</sup> 101 call data excludes other emergency services, alarms and SCOPE calls, thus only 101 calls from the public are included.

<sup>19</sup> Incidents recorded figures are based on disposed incidents only, as such any active incidents still being managed by a police control room are not included at the time of data extraction, and consequently, the number may increase by a very small margin over time - this is more relevant to recent data. Additionally, these figures contain all incidents, those raised as a result of a contact by a member of the public, and those created as a result of proactive police action or police admin etc – no filters are applied.

<sup>20</sup> National Group 1-7 recorded crime and offence data.

<sup>21</sup> Police Scotland unable to provide abandoned call figure for East 2014-15 due to lack of complete annual statistics from Bilston Glen.

<sup>22</sup> Grade of service is the percentage of calls answered within 10 seconds (for 999 calls) or 40 seconds (for 101 calls). Targets of 90% were set prior to Police Scotland by ACPO(S).





Table 2 – Police Scotland regional 999 and 101 performance – calls received April 2015 to March 2016

|                                  | West    | East    | North   |
|----------------------------------|---------|---------|---------|
| <b>999 Received</b>              | 222,105 | 151,109 | 49,774  |
| <b>999 Grade of Service</b>      | 94.2%   | 91.7%   | 93.0%   |
| <b>101 Received<sup>23</sup></b> | 885,412 | 633,661 | 635,798 |
| <b>101 Grade of Service</b>      | 91.8%   | 92.4%   | 81.7%   |

Table 3 – Police Scotland regional 999 and 101 performance – calls received April to October 2016

|                                  | West    | East    | North <sup>24</sup> |
|----------------------------------|---------|---------|---------------------|
| <b>999 Received</b>              | 143,061 | 96,236  | 31,744              |
| <b>999 Grade of Service</b>      | 97.2%   | 94.3%   | -                   |
| <b>101 Received<sup>25</sup></b> | 586,137 | 383,860 | 341,676             |
| <b>101 Grade of Service</b>      | 94.5%   | 92.6%   | -                   |

18. There was a 15% reduction in 999 calls and a 32% reduction in 101 calls in 2015-16 when compared with the previous year. This overall reduction in call volumes has been attributed in part by Police Scotland to work on reducing failure demand.<sup>26</sup> This work has included marketing campaigns on appropriate use of 101 and 999 and general communications (including the use of social media) to promote the work of the division. Other work has also included targeting the 'top 50 callers' and ensuring that Police Scotland and key partners use direct dial numbers where appropriate.
19. Further work on failure demand has been undertaken to analyse areas where additional improvements can be made and C3 Division is progressing this work internally as well as with other divisions where there are dependencies on each other's processes. These areas include response to lower priority calls and non-police specific incidents.
20. The level of discontinued<sup>27</sup> calls to 101 attracted some media interest in September 2016. Although there is a perception that calls may be unanswered, calls are discontinued for a variety of reasons, including caller choice, and cannot be solely attributed to C3 call answer times. Table 1 demonstrates that, as a percentage, the level of discontinued calls is 2.4% and is continuing to decrease year on year. C3

<sup>23</sup> See note 15.

<sup>24</sup> North Grade of Service % not available as three contact centres on different ICT systems.

<sup>25</sup> See note 15.

<sup>26</sup> Failure demand most commonly defined as demand on an organisation caused by 'a failure to do something or do something right for the customer' or 'avoidable contact'.


<sup>27</sup> Letter from ACC Hawkins, Police Scotland to Convener of the Scottish Parliament Justice Committee, 16 September 2016.

[http://www.parliament.scot/S5\\_JusticeCommittee/General%20Documents/20160916PStoMM.pdf](http://www.parliament.scot/S5_JusticeCommittee/General%20Documents/20160916PStoMM.pdf)

Division monitors these on a regular basis and expect levels will further reduce after the implementation of the PSSC in November 2016.

21. In our Final Report we noted that 999 calls cannot be 'lost' in the system unless the caller themselves hangs up. In our call audit, we established that considerable efforts are made to trace discontinued or silent 999 calls, with multiple calls and visits made to ensure that all is well. In the last year, BT has not highlighted any issues to Police Scotland in terms of 999 response levels.
22. C3 Division has initiated a benchmarking programme with 'best practice' forces in England and Wales and has conducted a number of visits which are informing ongoing improvement. An Expert Reference Group, which includes representatives from private sector and other large forces, was also formed in early 2016. This has met several times to provide advice on key areas of development.
23. HMICS noted in our Final Report that Police Scotland reports a range of call handling performance indicators in a number of report formats. However, we recommended that the performance framework required to be further developed to include a wider and more balanced set of indicators. The development of a revised performance management framework has continued over the past year, with a new format and focus being implemented supported by members of the SPA Board through the GAAG. Work is still ongoing on the development of more qualitative measures.
24. The measurement of user satisfaction was a specific issue raised in our Final Report. The relatively broad nature of the questions used in the previous question set did not provide a clear assessment of C3 service satisfaction. C3 Division has since added two additional questions to the survey which relate specifically to its own service levels. Table 4 below shows results in excess of 94% for both questions for the first two quarters of 2016-17.

Table 4 – C3 Customer Satisfaction<sup>28</sup>



<sup>28</sup> Source: Police Scotland.

25. A review of programme benefits has been undertaken with a new benefits realisation plan and set of measures developed, including incorporating benefits measurement into the C3 performance framework. Similarly, improvements in financial management have supported enhanced financial reporting, although further work is still required to develop an updated savings profile.
26. HMICS recommended that the C3 complaints handling process should be standardised to support improvement. C3 Division reviewed its process and has issued further guidance to staff alongside improved monitoring of complaints (and notable incident monitoring – see paragraph 83) to ensure that learning is captured and any required improvement is implemented in a systematic way.
27. Complaints data is regularly publicly reported to the SPA Complaints and Conduct Committee, although this may be subject to change under the new SPA governance arrangements and revised committee structures.<sup>29</sup>

**Table 5 – C3 Complaints**

|                                   | <b>2014-15</b> | <b>2015-16</b> | <b>April-Oct YTD<br/>2016-17</b> |
|-----------------------------------|----------------|----------------|----------------------------------|
| Number of calls received          | 3,668,487      | 2,577,869      | 1,606,473                        |
| Number of complaints              | 245            | 304            | 182                              |
| Number of allegations             | 301            | 381            | 215                              |
| % of complaints of calls received | 0.006%         | 0.012%         | 0.011%                           |


28. HMICS previously undertook informal comparison of complaints data with some other UK forces. While there are different recording practices, this provided a degree of reassurance to Police Scotland that complaint allegations as a percentage of total calls at a force level is not significantly different from some of the other forces in England and Wales.


## **Leadership and governance**

29. The Leadership and Governance section of our Final Report included recommendations 5 to 11.
30. Recommendation 5 of our Final Report, carried forward from our Interim Report, required that Police Scotland should consolidate and stabilise its staffing, systems, procedures and processes prior to the transfer of any service centre or ACR functions from the North (Dundee, Aberdeen and Inverness). This recommendation was made specifically to mitigate the risk of a repeat of the circumstances in the East in early 2015, which had resulted in previous weaknesses.
31. C3 Division has continued to progress this stabilisation, through ICT system and network upgrades, process standardisation and the implementation of the virtualised PSSC where calls can be taken from anywhere in the country across centres in Bilton, Govan and Motherwell to better manage demand across Scotland.

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<sup>29</sup>For more information about the SPA's Complaints and Conduct Committee, see:  
<http://www.spa.police.uk/meetings-events/complaints-and-conduct/>

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32. Stabilisation will be fully assessed at each key milestone in the programme i.e. following the transfer of calls from Dundee in January 2017, Aberdeen in March 2017 and Inverness in June 2017. HMICS has undertaken specific assurance work around readiness for the next key milestones and can confirm that C3 Division completed the required level of change management and quality assurance for the establishment of the PSSC and transfer of call handling functions from Dundee.
  33. The SPA Board gave their approval on 15 December 2016 to allow the operational transition from call taking in Dundee to transfer to the PSSC. This was deferred until after the festive season but took place on 10 January 2017. Given that 101 calls were already subject to overflow to the PSSC and that work had been undertaken to ensure PSSC staff were ready to manage these calls, the actual transition itself, was limited to a transfer of all 101 calls and 999 calls (which had previously been answered by Dundee ACR staff). Grade of Service levels and call demand were carefully monitored during the switch over and to date there have been no issues to report.
  34. HMICS highlighted a lack of clarity around the strategic vision for the C3 service, with no alignment to wider policing strategy. C3 Division has now drafted a new vision and objectives which can be used more effectively as a basis for setting policy and operational direction as well as internal communication to provide a focus for cultural change as the division moves forward.
  35. HMICS highlighted weaknesses in the governance and reporting of major change projects from both SPA and Police Scotland. An SPA C3 Governance and Assurance Group, led by members of the SPA Board, was formally established in early 2016 and has proved to be an effective forum for more detailed scrutiny of the programme. HMICS views this approach as good practice. Police Scotland has also completed a review of its programme and project governance structures and processes. This will be fully implemented as part of a revised corporate governance framework by the end of March 2017.
  36. There have been a number of changes in senior management which have taken place within C3 over the past year which have resulted in strengthened cohesion of the management team. The new Divisional Commander has a strong focus on effective engagement with his management team and C3 staff, as well as internal and external partners.
  37. There is now clarity between the management of the C3IR change programme and the management of BAU within the division. The establishment of a People Board and an Operations Board has further strengthened BAU governance and management.
  38. An experienced and qualified C3 Programme Manager was appointed and took up post on 1 May 2016. The appointment of this individual took longer than HMICS had initially expected. Prior to this appointment Police Scotland had also appointed a team of experienced officers to strengthen and support the management of the programme. Their combined contribution to improvements in both programme management and quality assurance are acknowledged. Training in the roles of programme and project board members has also taken place. The Programme Board now has consistent and well managed agendas and meetings, with quality reporting and a focus on the scrutiny of progress and risk.
  39. Quality assurance was highlighted as a key issue for the C3 programme in our report. C3 Division has embraced this recommendation and developed a comprehensive



approach to the planning and commissioning of programme and project assurance. Independent assurance has been deployed at key stages of the programme over the past year including specialist ICT and workforce planning. Layers of assurance are now clearly defined and in place for the remaining key stages of the programme.


40. Risk management has improved with separate registers for the programme and BAU being actively maintained and reviewed at management team and programme boards.
41. A new benefits framework and plan are now in place to measure a set of revised benefits of the new C3 model. Whilst financial savings continue to feature in the framework, a more balanced set of operational benefits has also been developed. These benefit measures will also feature in regular performance and financial reporting.
42. HMICS recommended that Police Scotland undertakes a review of its use of Gold Groups,<sup>30</sup> specifically in terms of their use as a leadership response to issues of governance or broader corporate impact. The use of Gold Groups is currently under review by the corporate Training and Development function. As of January 2017, this review has not yet completed. Police Scotland requires to consider its use of both Gold Groups and Short-Life Working Groups as part of its review of corporate governance (see paragraph 35).

## People

43. The People section of our Final Report included recommendations 12 to 15.
44. HMICS has found that C3 staff continue to be strongly committed to providing a good service to the public. They have maintained a high level of engagement with management throughout a period of intensive change and development. HMICS has continued to focus on engaging with staff and staff associations over the past year to ensure that their views are reflected in our work.
45. HMICS reported that staff engagement and consultation by Police Scotland during the original C3IR change programme could have been more effective. As previously noted, the new Divisional Commander has placed a strong emphasis on improved communication and engagement. A professional Communications Officer now supports this work. A Communications Strategy and Plan have been developed and a staff survey conducted to inform the direction. Improved systems of daily briefing, focus groups, feedback and information screens have been implemented and C3 recognises that communication will remain a priority for improvement over the next six to 12 months.
46. Original assumptions on C3 staffing levels were highlighted by HMICS as being limited by a lack of legacy data and comparators. Staffing levels have since improved and planned recruitment has continued to ensure that demand is met, particularly in terms of the future transfer of calls from the North. C3 Division has spent considerable time in developing a new workforce planning model, based on realistic evidence-based assumptions, which has been independently validated as accurate for the proposed

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<sup>30</sup> The formal command structure known as Gold, Silver and Bronze is sometimes referred to as the strategic, tactical and operational model. This can be applied to both spontaneous incidents as well as planned events. The structure provides for the delivery of a strategic, tactical and operational response to an incident or operation. See National Policing Improvement Agency, [Guidance on Command and Control](#) (2009).




model of operation. These revised staffing numbers were fully approved by the Chief Constable and the Senior Leadership Board on 19 October 2016. Since that time, the establishment of the single virtualised PSSC and upgrade of the ASPIRE CRM have had a positive impact on average call handling times (AHT). HMICS notes that it is essential that any revised assumptions are tested and run through the model, prior to the implementation of any key stage, then considered by the SPA GAAG prior to any changes being made.

47. C3 management has made significant efforts to engage staff in the change process and provide reassurance, however there is understandably some anxiety amongst staff in Bilston about forthcoming changes after their past experience. Many C3 staff have raised the wider organisational issue of harmonisation of terms and conditions as having a direct impact on their morale. The delay in this process and the potential impact of re-grading is beyond the control of C3 Division and is a wider corporate issue for Police Scotland and the SPA.
48. In our Final Report we noted that there had been limited use of police officers in service centres to provide cover in early to mid-2015. Their use was adopted as a limited short term measure to address staff shortages associated with the transfer of Stirling and Glenrothes calls to Bilston Glen. HMICS did not review the use of these specific officers nor their training or experience as these were matters exclusively within the scope of the PIRC inquiry.<sup>31</sup> However, Police Scotland has confirmed that no untrained officers are being used to supplement either service centre or ACR environments. This has been validated by HMICS through fieldwork and by staff associations.
49. Staffing challenges remain in the North, where interim arrangements are in place pending the transfer of service centre and/or ACR functions, which will take place over the next six months. Staff have continued to experience levels of uncertainty and delays in confirming their future roles, being refused permission to move to other jobs elsewhere in Police Scotland or when/if they will receive Voluntary Redundancy/Early Retirement (VR/ER). HMICS has continued to highlight these issues and C3 Division, alongside its local policing colleagues, has attempted to mitigate associated risks. The SPA are fully aware of these risks.
50. In Aberdeen, overtime as well as trained staff from Dundee and local policing have been used to supplement the ACR. Early attempts at recruiting temporary or agency staff for this service centre have not been successful and C3 began to 'overflow' 101 calls to the PSSC in mid December 2016. This resulted in improved grade of service to the public. In Dundee, ACR staff provided cover for shortages in their service centre answering 101 calls, although these calls also overflowed to Govan/Motherwell for some time to better manage demand prior to full transition in January 2017.
51. The current VR/ER scheme in operation by the SPA as the employer of all police staff and officers is valid until 31 March 2017. With the Aberdeen service centre functions due to transfer in March 2017, staff remain concerned that they will not have access to this current scheme, and that any new approved scheme may be less attractive. This has been highlighted to Police Scotland and the SPA.

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<sup>31</sup> PIRC, *PIRC investigation: death of couple following recovery of car at Bannockburn on 8 July 2015*.

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52. A new training strategy and flexible training delivery plan have been put in place. The delivery plan requires further development and to be effectively resourced. Training is consistent across all locations and delivered through a single training team. Additional training has been developed and delivered for ACR supervisors, high speed pursuit and risk and vulnerability assessment. Plans are being developed to link training requirements to the new Police Scotland review process (Personal Development Conversations) and continuous professional development. HMICS will continue to monitor this closely through our ongoing assurance work.
53. Through the governance of the People Board and monitoring at all supervisory levels, C3 continues to exercise effective scrutiny over attendance. Whilst C3 absence rates remain slightly higher than force average figures, this is reflective of the service centre environment. Absence levels compare favourably with other public and private sector call centre environments.<sup>32</sup> Absence at Bilston has significantly reduced over the past six months, and overall short term absence is also reduced. Officer absences continue to reduce month on month and staff absences have also maintained a reducing trend. This is in line with overall force trends and is an indicator of improved stability of resourcing within the division.

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<sup>32</sup> The Contact Centre Association (CCA) highlight that call centre absence within private and public sector organisations is recognised as being higher than in other types of industry.



## Resources

54. The Resources section of our Final Report included recommendations 16 to 22.
55. We reported in our Final Report that the ICT systems in place within C3 were generally fit for purpose in terms of basic functionality, their stability remained in question with a direct impact on day to day operations. This was particularly acute in the East where the performance of the CRM system was a major issue for staff and was impacting on effective call handling.
56. Police Scotland has since invested in upgrading network infrastructure, ICT resilience and the CRM system itself. This has improved performance, impacting positively on morale and contributing to the improved stability of C3 overall.
57. Police Scotland also successfully implemented the STORM Unity system in Dundee, replacing the Tayside legacy command and control application and ensuring that the ACR in the North can effectively share incident and resource allocation information with the ACRs in the West and East through this single national system. This implementation included extensive training, refresher training, staff support and independent technical assurance and was well received by staff. Subsequent visits to Dundee have confirmed that staff have adapted well to the new system.
58. The planned procurement and implementation of an integrated suite of new technologies was postponed indefinitely in late 2015. Police Scotland has however confirmed that STORM Unity and Aspire CRM will continue to be deployed for the short to medium term. Police Scotland regularly engages with suppliers to discuss future product developments and this may present further opportunities for C3. However, upgrade of the Integrated Communication Control System (ICCS)<sup>33</sup> and telephony platform are required and will be progressed as part of ongoing upgrade and maintenance in the years ahead.
59. We noted in our Final Report that we had observed service advisors across all sites using paper 'scribble pads' alongside their ICT systems. These were considered necessary due to the frequent need to quickly write down critical information from a caller, who may not always be coherent or structured in providing information or when ICT systems were slow. However, we identified areas for improvement and recommended that their use should be reviewed and C3 Division should provide definitive guidance on their use, issue and proportionate supervision.
60. A system of numbered notebook issue has since been implemented with user guidance and is in operational use within all centres. Supervisory checks and guidance have now also been implemented to ensure the new process is maintained. Regular tracking is maintained centrally by the division to ensure this process is embedded. HMICS will continue to monitor these quality assurance processes.

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<sup>33</sup> An Integrated Communication Control System (ICCS) provides the voice and data communications is the technology which provides a single touchscreen control to a host of integrated subsystems including radio systems, call handling systems, digital and analogue telephony, CCTV, voice recorders, intercom systems, door locks and alarms.





61. BCP across C3 sites has been tested regularly, and has proven to be well managed and maintains service and performance during periods of down time. A dedicated Business Continuity Officer has co-ordinated the ongoing development and standardisation of these plans. All plans have now been updated and validated by the corporate Business Continuity Advisor and a testing plan is also in place. HMICS regularly monitors the level of system outages and downtime.
62. C3 Division has continued to introduce improvements to the current address 'look up' gazetteer and internal directory. However some staff continue to feel they do not fully meet operational requirements. The gazetteer, along with the 'A to Z' are key tools in supporting the transfer of local knowledge to staff in the PSSC and HMICS will continue to seek assurance over these systems. It is also noted that the C3 approach to information audit is not currently providing the necessary levels of assurance required.
63. HMICS in our Final Report recommended that Police Scotland should engage with other emergency services to investigate the feasibility of developing a bespoke address gazetteer for Scotland. All agencies currently have existing software applications linked to specific gazetteers and will consider a single version in their future planning. Police Scotland is continuing to work with the Improvement Service and their system supplier to improve the data quality and search capabilities of the current gazetteer. C3 Division has also met with the 32 Council gazetteer custodians to discuss policing business requirements.
64. In preparation for the introduction of the PSSC and the transfer of calls from Dundee, Service Advisors had training and awareness sessions and were provided with detailed information toolkits for reference and to support the ongoing development of their local knowledge.
65. C3 Division has continued to work with the Police Scotland Finance directorate to improve the quality of financial reporting. These reports are now considered by the management team, Programme Board and SPA Governance and Assurance Group.
66. The previous stages of remodelling in Dumfries, Stirling and Glenrothes enabled the release of 124 posts through VR/ER. This has delivered a net financial benefit to date of £2.355m.
67. With the migration of business from Dundee service centre in January 2017, it is expected that 12 members of staff will leave Police Scotland on VR/ER. Planned remodelling in Aberdeen in March 2017 will, potentially, allow the release of up to 77 posts through VR/ER. The anticipated gross benefit from VR/ER, to be realised in financial year 2017-18, is estimated at £6.3m, however, this will require to be balanced against the projected increase in staff as a result of the recently approved workforce planning review (see paragraph 46).
68. HMICS notes that savings realised in 2015-16 and 2016-17 are reduced from those originally forecast due to these factors. Previous savings projections are detailed in Table 6. Revised VR/ER projections are detailed in Table 7.



Table 6 – C3IR estimated savings as of November 2015

| Financial year | Cashable savings<br>(as of Oct 15) |
|----------------|------------------------------------|
| 2014-15        | £1.1m                              |
| 2015-16        | £4.18m - £4.78m                    |
| 2016-17        | £5.18m - £6.78m                    |
| 2017-18        | £5.18m - £6.78m                    |

Table 7 – C3IR estimated gross VR/ER savings by Financial Year £'000 (as of December 2016)

|                             | Dumfries, Stirling<br>& Glenrothes | Dundee       | Aberdeen       | Total           |
|-----------------------------|------------------------------------|--------------|----------------|-----------------|
| Staff Numbers <sup>34</sup> | 124                                | 15           | 77             | 216             |
| <b>Financial Year</b>       |                                    |              |                |                 |
| 2014-2015                   | 476.5                              | 0.0          | 0.0            | 476.5           |
| 2015-2016                   | 3,501.0                            | 0.0          | 0.0            | 3,501.0         |
| 2016-2017                   | 3,701.2                            | 92.1         | 0.0            | 3,793.3         |
| 2017-2018                   | 3,701.2                            | 368.6        | 2,637.3        | 6,707.1         |
| <b>Cumulative Totals</b>    | <b>11,379.9</b>                    | <b>460.7</b> | <b>2,637.3</b> | <b>14,477.9</b> |

69. In October 2015 after the publication of our Interim Report, the Cabinet Secretary for Justice announced funding of £1.4m for C3 to accelerate recruitment as per our original recommendation (Recommendation 5 in our Final Report). The expenditure was limited to the financial year 2015-2016. Discussions between Police Scotland and Scottish Government concluded there was no facility to carry forward unallocated funds. However Scottish Government agreed that Police Scotland could use the balance as part of their wider budget in 2015-16 on the understanding that key C3 improvement measures would continue to be funded from their 2016-17 budget, to reflect the revised implementation programme.
70. Subsequently, C3 Division has reported that £627k of this money was spent, with the majority being on staff and officer overtime. The staff costs were incurred to coordinate and manage the delivery of HMICS recommendations and to create a Programme Office to deliver improved planning and assurance activities. Overtime costs were associated with providing operational stability in both Bilston and Aberdeen between November 2015 and March 2016.
71. The National Database Enquiry Unit (NDEU), is still planned to be located in Inverness and to be implemented in June 2017. The PNC Unit in Govan will be retained and provide resilience. A full business case was presented to the C3IR Programme Board in December 2016 but was referred for further assurance on functionality and costs. However, staff in Inverness continue to experience a high degree of uncertainty as to

<sup>34</sup> 2016-17 and 2017-18 figures are indicative estimates due to ER/VR uncertainty of exact number of staff who will ultimately be taking these options.

their future. Communication and engagement has been challenging when further detail cannot yet be confirmed. Police Scotland requires to progress this issue as soon as possible and engage with staff more directly in the exact design and implementation of the NDEU.


72. Regular financial monitoring demonstrates the reduction in core budgets as well as an in-year reduction in the use of overtime, which indicates the stabilisation of staffing numbers. It is however noted that overtime is still being used in the North as part of interim arrangements.
73. Table 8 was previously included in our Final Report and has been updated with the latest revenue budget position. This demonstrates that staffing budgets have remained relatively stable with 2015-16 full year net spend showing a saving of approximately £1m from 2013-14 figures. The increase in police officer numbers within the division is reflected in an increase in officer costs. Reduced numbers of staff brought about through closure of service centres has decreased staffing costs between 2013-14 and 2015-16, however projections for 2016-17 show an increase reflecting an uplift attributed to the new workforce model.

Table 8 – C3 Division Revenue Budget

| Cost / Income Area     | 2013-14       |               | 2014-15       |               | 2015-16       |               | 2016-17       |               |
|------------------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|
|                        | Budget        | Actual        | Budget        | Actual        | Budget        | Actual        | P7 YTD Budget | P7 YTD Actual |
|                        | £000          | £000          | £000          | £000          | £000          | £000          | £000          | £000          |
| Police Officer Costs   | 14,054        | 16,730        | 15,282        | 17,876        | 16,232        | 18,757        | 9,306         | 10,907        |
| Overtime Officers      | 351           | 323           | 269           | 319           | 268           | 614           | 159           | 142           |
| Police Staff Costs     | 41,150        | 40,498        | 40,536        | 38,674        | 34,600        | 37,402        | 21,942        | 23,052        |
| Overtime Staff         | 481           | 711           | 480           | 943           | 471           | 1,100         | 267           | 255           |
| Other                  | 29            | 18            | 15            | 38            | 12            | 54            | 3             | 8             |
| <b>Employees Total</b> | <b>56,065</b> | <b>58,280</b> | <b>56,582</b> | <b>57,850</b> | <b>51,583</b> | <b>57,927</b> | <b>31,677</b> | <b>34,364</b> |
| Premises               | 581           | 503           | 656           | 541           | 2             | 7             | 0             | 43            |
| Transport              | 105           | 118           | 192           | 131           | 146           | 162           | 76            | 86            |
| Supplies & Services    | 257           | 361           | 194           | 124           | 92            | 74            | 38            | 118           |
| Administration         | 143           | 144           | 132           | 71            | 88            | 214           | 69            | 65            |
| Third Party Payments   | 35            | 0             | 0             | 0             | 0             | 0             | 0             | 0             |
| <b>Gross Total</b>     | <b>57,186</b> | <b>59,406</b> | <b>57,756</b> | <b>58,717</b> | <b>51,911</b> | <b>58,384</b> | <b>31,860</b> | <b>34,676</b> |
| Fees & Charges         | (716)         | (856)         | (716)         | (822)         | (814)         | (774)         | (427)         | (397)         |
| Other Income           | 0             | (2)           | (290)         | (1)           | (1)           | (6)           | 0             | (8)           |
| <b>Net Total</b>       | <b>56,470</b> | <b>58,548</b> | <b>56,750</b> | <b>57,894</b> | <b>51,096</b> | <b>57,604</b> | <b>31,433</b> | <b>34,271</b> |


## Planning and process

74. The Planning and Process section of our Final Report included recommendations 23 to 30.

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75. In our Final Report, HMICS reported that basic call handling processes were in place although consistency, understanding and definition of these processes all needed to develop further. The lack of investment in process mapping and capturing local variances had been a weakness in the original C3 change approach.
  76. Through the new Operations Board, C3 Division has continued to develop standardised consistent processes. However HMICS is clear that this work requires to continue apace with dedicated resources and a clear presumption towards developing standardised national processes. Police Scotland should be confident that the balance is right between efficient consistent processes and effective local flexibility.
  77. There has been good progress in preparatory work identifying business processes within the existing North service centre and ACR environments which require to be re-engineered and/or transferred to local policing or other operational divisions.
  78. Work is ongoing to revise and improve SOPs in C3. It is proposed that of the original five SOPs which were in existence during our assurance review, the Airwave SOP will remain (a framework for radio communications across the whole of Police Scotland) and the others will be combined into a new simplified single C3 SOP. HMICS welcomes this development, but had expected that this area would have progressed faster.
  79. Effective initial assessment of risk and vulnerability is a key skill and a vital part of the call handling process. HMICS found that this required to be enhanced in the service centre environment although it was already stronger within ACRs. C3 Division has introduced a new risk and vulnerability training package which has been delivered to all service centre staff. Further work is still required to assess the impact of this training. Police Scotland is now also actively developing a business case for the adoption of the THRIVE<sup>35</sup> methodology for risk and vulnerability assessment across all of the service. HMICS welcomes this approach.
  80. Grading, prioritisation and appropriate dispatch of police officers continues to work well for emergency and high priority calls. As referenced in paragraph 18, we have identified that there is a degree of failure demand related to lower priority calls. This is attributable to a range of factors including a lack of available officers to attend incidents in some locations, repeated failures to attend scheduled appointments and failure to update callers on the status of their call. Police Scotland still requires to holistically address issues of failure demand across divisional boundaries and take a 'whole system' approach to these issues.
  81. The C3IR change programme has adopted an embedded multi-layer approach to quality assurance. This framework was put in place and reported to the SPA Board at its meeting on 31 March 2016. Assurance responsibilities are now clearly allocated in plans, with appropriate approvals required for quality deliverables such as internal governance and independent reviews. The programme is also engaging in the independent Gateway Review process with a review commissioned for early 2017.


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<sup>35</sup> THRIVE (Threat, Harm, Risk, Investigation, Vulnerability, Engagement) is a risk management tool, widely used in England and Wales, which considers six elements to assist in identifying the appropriate response grade based on the needs of the caller and the circumstances of the incident. This approach was highlighted in the final HMICS report (paragraph 340).

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82. The business case for establishing a permanent quality assurance unit has recently been approved with a small team to be located in Aberdeen. Although there are a number of quality assurance processes already in place, a BAU quality framework has yet to be implemented. HMICS was clear that this was a priority and notes that this area remains under-developed.
  83. A new standardised 'notable incident' process was introduced in April 2016, which when considered alongside analysis of risk, complaints and other improvement areas, provides an enhanced approach to learning across the division. The process encourages all staff to report potential issues, which supports development on an individual basis but also in identifying common issues.
  84. HMICS has reviewed the notable incident process introduced by C3 Division in response to Recommendation 26 of our call handling review. Overall, we found the notable incident process was working well and appeared to add value by supporting learning and improvement within C3 Division. We have therefore discharged Recommendation 26. However, we have also identified aspects of the notable incident process which could be further developed and improved. Given the recent media interest in relation to this process, a summary of our review of the notable incident process is included at Appendix 2.
  85. HMICS noted in its Final Report that Public Assistance Desks (PADs) play a vital supporting role in resolution at first point of contact. The original Strategic Direction<sup>36</sup> for C3 set out the intention to move to a national PAD aligned to a national service centre, which was dependent on the implementation of a national crime management system to be delivered through the i6 programme, which has since been cancelled. This has delayed the development of a full business case with future options for PAD deployment. Work has however continued in terms of demand analysis and consideration of the impact of THRIVE and the new 2026 vision on any proposals.
  86. In the meantime, HMICS has continued to find significant variation in the role and resourcing of PADs, which can cause confusion in terms of relative responsibilities and delays in the handling of lower priority calls. Police Scotland still requires to develop a plan for the progression of PADs and ensure that consistent processes are used wherever possible, until the full business case can be approved.
  87. A Service Overview function is now being established in the North, to complement those already established in the East and West. This work was accelerated to ensure that the resourcing of tactical firearms command can be managed from a single point prior to the transfer of any functions to the PSSC.
  88. A group has been established with Operational Support Division (OSD) to develop a national approach to major incident plans, converting existing major incident and emergency response plans into a single format on the national STORM Unity system, known as STORM action plans. This will ensure that the policing response to a wide range of incident types is consistent across the country.

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<sup>36</sup> The Strategic Direction approved by the SPA on 30 January 2014 set out a staged programme of rationalisation and change across all service centres and control rooms in Scotland, including transfer and relocation of functions, closures and implementation of new processes and ICT systems.

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89. This work commenced with the conversion of Highland and Islands Division emergency plans into the new format in time for the introduction of STORM Unity in Dundee. The North East Division plans will follow and it is anticipated that this will allow the creation of a wide range of generic STORM action plans which can be rolled out nationally as these become available.
  90. The National Database Enquiry Unit (NDEU), is still planned to be located in Inverness and to be implemented in June 2017. The PNC Unit in Govan will be retained and provide resilience. A full business case was presented to the C3IR Programme Board in December 2016 but was referred for further assurance on functionality and costs. However, staff in Inverness continue to experience a high degree of uncertainty as to their future. Communication and engagement has been challenging when further detail cannot yet be confirmed. Police Scotland requires to progress this issue as soon as possible and engage with staff more directly in the exact design and implementation of the NDEU.

## Partnership

91. The police service has long recognised the benefits of working with partners to deal with contact from the public to ensure that services are provided to meet the needs of the individual caller and to make best use of resources. To varying degrees, legacy forces in Scotland adopted partnership approaches to managing demand, and models such as Joint Agency Control Centres (JACC) or Multi Agency Control Centres (MACC) set up to deal with major events and incidents, are well established and continue to be used by Police Scotland.
92. For some time C3 Division has been investigating options for improving assessment of risk and vulnerability and specifically considering how to deal more effectively with incidents involving mental health issues. Police Scotland C3 and National Safer Communities Divisions have visited forces in England and conducted research into pilot schemes in England and Wales where mental health nurses are working in police control rooms to improve the recognition of mental health issues at the first point of contact with the police, and to enhance the service by assessing the most appropriate response.
93. A range of pilot schemes for mental health community triage and distress brief interventions are underway in most local policing divisions in an effort to deal more effectively with operational demand and to contribute to better outcomes for individuals and communities. The results of these pilots will influence the decision of collaborative approaches in a control room setting. HMICS expects that a fully costed benefits case will be developed by Police Scotland to inform its decision making in terms of any future provision for integrated mental health teams within police ACRs.
94. Another example of partnership working relates to the enhanced collaboration between Police Scotland and the Scottish Ambulance Service (SAS). During the Easter weekend 2016 a joint Police Scotland and SAS triage desk operated within Bilston ACR covering all C3 command areas. During this period 186 incidents were triaged by the desk which, on evaluation, saw improved service delivery by ensuring the most appropriate first response; increased positive outcomes for the public; reduced demand for both services, and encouraged partnership working.
95. A further extended six week pilot of the triage desk within the police control room at Bilston took place during the festive period 2016. During this pilot a standalone SAS





Command and Control system was integrated within the police control room with Ambulance liaison officers and C3 controllers working side by side. A full evaluation is due to be carried out to assess future viability.

96. There remains a wider expectation that Police Scotland, along with its blue light partners in Scotland will explore further opportunities for shared services. In the case of C3, this would relate directly to shared service centres and/or control rooms. The complexities of such a venture cannot be underestimated, with the requirement to complete the current C3 programme and the prospect of another major change programme to come in Police Scotland to deliver a new longer term vision. However HMICS expects that Police Scotland will consider these options as it moves forward, with a focus on improving services rather than making further efficiency savings.
97. The challenging financial environment for other public services and the third sector has resulted in difficult decisions being made about the service that can be provided to the public. Decisions made by local authorities and other partner agencies to reduce or remove resources has been seen to have an impact on the demand for police services, with Police Scotland becoming the agency of “first resort”, dealing with issues that might be better addressed by social services, health services, or other specialist support. HMICS has identified that there is a degree of failure demand related to the requirement for Police Scotland to attend incidents which has not traditionally been part of its core role.
98. HMICS encourages Police Scotland to work with public sector partners and other stakeholders to develop a deeper understanding of the needs of communities when developing a future vision for the police service.



## Appendix 1 – Recommendations status

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This appendix sets out the 30 recommendations which were made in our Final Report and the key evidence which has been presented by Police Scotland and has been evaluated by HMICS. This includes the current status of each recommendation, which can be in one of three categories:

**Open** – Not yet progressed or still work in progress, with insufficient evidence as yet available.

**Partial Discharge** – Progressed, with sufficient evidence to clearly demonstrate that some elements of the recommendation have been completed, but others are still work in progress with evidence not yet sufficient for full discharge.

**Discharged** – Sufficient evidence to clearly demonstrate that all elements of the recommendation have been completed.

HMICS has also included further detail on the impact of implementing each recommendation.





| Ref | Recommendation   | Key Evidence   | Anticipated Impact/Outcome   | Status  |
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| 1   | <p>Police Scotland should commission further work to identify and reduce failure demand. This should include marketing and public communication around appropriate use of 999 and 101 numbers, targeting high volume callers and working across all Police Scotland divisions and with external partners to reduce demand and improve performance.</p> <p>[See paragraph 37 of our Final Report for further background to this recommendation and the improvement required].</p> | <p>Police Scotland has already provided evidence that overall call demand has reduced (see Table 1). C3 has undertaken targeted engagement to stop inappropriate use of 101 in addition to ongoing campaigns on the use of 101 and 999. Analysing the 'top 50 callers by volume' and addressing some of the issues identified in the HMICS audit of calls including clarity on processes for lost or stolen property, information on station opening hours and adding 'tags' to calls in the CRM system to improve demand management have all been progressed.</p> <p>This further progress is commended, however failure demand also relates to follow-up and repeated calls caused by non-attendance, delayed attendance, inaccurate information provision and failure to respond to messages left, which were highlighted within the HMICS Final Report. These issues are not C3-specific and are impacted by local policing resource levels and processes including the Managed Call Appointment System, (MCAS).</p> <p>HMICS has recently supported Police Scotland in benchmarking first point of contact models and demand reduction in other forces as well as identifying key areas of current failure demand. This work will improve understanding and support work to further reduce demand.</p> <p><i>This recommendation cannot be fully discharged until Police Scotland develop a corporate approach to overall demand management articulated through its 2026 future vision.</i></p> | <p>Reduced call volumes<br/>Clarity for public, partners and internal divisions on appropriate use of 101 and 999<br/>Improvements to A-Z process descriptions for staff to improve consistency of service.</p> <p>Ability to generate management information on the level of inappropriate calls<br/>Improved service at first point of contact.</p> <p>Reduction in demands on frontline policing.</p> | <p><b>Partial Discharge<br/>(May - June 2016)</b></p> |



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| 2 | <p>Police Scotland should review and identify any learning around 999 call performance that can be taken forward into the planning and governance of Stages 5, 6 and 7 of the C3IR project. This should include continued proactive engagement with BT to monitor 999 performance immediately prior to and during the implementation of these critical stages.</p> <p>[See paragraphs 38-45 of our Final Report for further background to this recommendation and the improvement required].</p> | <p>Police Scotland has strengthened its engagement with BT in relation to 999 call performance and introduced processes to ensure any issues identified are escalated to senior managers within C3. Previous issues with 999 performance have not re-occurred and grade of service remains high. Staffing levels and training are in place to meet demand. Engagement with other Scottish 999 agencies is now formalised and additional user satisfaction data collection is now being collected.</p> <p>999 call performance will be actively monitored during each key milestone in the C3IR change programme (i.e. Dundee in December 2016, Aberdeen in March 2017 and Inverness in June 2017).</p> | <p>999 response and performance levels remain high.</p> <p>Increased visibility of 999 performance during critical periods of change.</p>   | <b>Discharged<br/>(May 2016)</b>              |
| 3 | <p>Police Scotland should develop a balanced performance management framework for C3 Division, which aligns to both organisational and divisional strategic objectives. This should include qualitative, cost and outcome measures.</p> <p>[See paragraphs 58-63 of our Final Report for further background to this recommendation and the improvement required].</p>  | <p>C3 has made considerable progress on developing a revised performance framework based on the QUAT (Quality, Utilisation, Attrition, Timeliness) scorecard suggested by HMICS. This work has been supported by the SPA, with ongoing feedback provided by the C3 Governance and Assurance Group.</p> <p><i>This recommendation cannot be fully discharged until performance indicators begin to be produced from regular quality assurance activity (Recommendation 25) and benefits realisation (Recommendation 22). Alignment of the C3 reporting framework with that of Police Scotland as a whole will also be required.</i></p>   | <p>Improved reporting and transparency over C3 performance to support day to day operational management.</p> <p>Improved governance and accountability through effective public performance reporting</p> | <b>Partial Discharge<br/>(September 2016)</b> |
| 4 | <p>Police Scotland should review and standardise its C3 complaint handling processes as part of Stages 5 and 6 of the C3IR project. This should promote the consistent recording of quality of service issues and focus on identifying learning and improvement.</p>   | <p>An updated C3 National Complaint Handling process has been agreed and implemented. Complaint tracking is in place in East, West and North and guidance issued to all staff.</p> <p>The process is now embedded and information used to inform improvement. Reporting is included</p>  | <p>Improved accuracy and monitoring of C3 complaints data supporting improvement process.</p> <p>Improved governance and accountability through greater</p>   | <b>Discharged<br/>(May 2016)</b>              |



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|   | [See paragraphs 69-72 of our Final Report for further background to this recommendation and the improvement required].   | as part of national Police Scotland public complaints monitoring by SPA.   | public transparency of C3 complaints.   |  |
| 5 | <p>Police Scotland should consolidate and stabilise its staffing, systems, procedures and processes in both the East and West service centres and area control rooms. While this is being progressed, detailed planning for the previously agreed end-state model should continue, with consideration given to accelerating the recruitment of staff and early commissioning of the North Area Control Room in Dundee.</p> <p>[See paragraph 95 of our Final Report for further background to this recommendation and the improvement required].</p> | <p>C3 has progressed well with stabilising staffing (Recommendation 12), systems (Recommendation 17) and procedures and processes (Recommendation 23).</p> <p>Stability around the transfer of the Dundee service centre has been subject to a number of assurance processes and approved by the C3IR Programme Board, Police Scotland Executive, SPA Governance and Assurance Group and SPA Board.</p> <p><i>This recommendation cannot be discharged until stability is demonstrated at the point of each of the key milestones of the programme (i.e. Dundee in December 2016, Aberdeen in March 2017 and Inverness in June 2017).</i></p>  | <p>Stability of ICT, staffing levels, procedures and processes.</p> <p>Improvement in staff morale and positive feedback from staff and trade associations.</p> <p>Performance and readiness for transfers from the North.</p>  | <b>Partial Discharge (December 2016)</b> |
| 6 | <p>Police Scotland should articulate a clear vision for its Contact, Command and Control (C3) service and develop an overall strategy for customer contact. This should involve engagement with communities and key stakeholders and lead to the publication of standards of service.</p> <p>[See paragraphs 105-109 of our Final Report for further background to this recommendation and the improvement required].</p>  | <p>C3 has developed a new vision and objectives/commitments for its service. These focus on a high quality of customer service, identifying risk and vulnerability and making best use of resources to effectively manage demand.</p> <p>However the development of a customer contact strategy with associated engagement processes and publication of standards of service has not yet taken place. This is primarily due to the development of a ten year vision for the service as a whole, which will encompass these areas. Consultation will be taking place on this vision and supporting plans in early 2017 and HMICS will continue to monitor progress in this area.</p> <p><i>This recommendation cannot be discharged until</i></p> | <p>Design of the national call handling service and communications can now focus around a clear vision and objectives supporting wider cultural change and focus on quality of service.</p> <p>Development of a customer contact strategy and publication of supporting standards of service.</p> | <b>Partial Discharge (November 2016)</b> |



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|   |  | <i>the new vision has been integrated within the wider 2026 Strategy and the development of an overall strategy for customer contact and published standards of services are included as deliverables within any 2026 implementation plan.</i>   |  |   |
| 7 | <p>Police Scotland should appoint an experienced and qualified programme manager with immediate effect to manage the remaining stages of the C3IR project. It should also ensure that key project board members are appropriately trained and experienced.</p> <p>[See paragraphs 120-127 of our Final Report for further background to this recommendation and improvement required].</p> | <p>A Programme Manager was appointed with a start date of 1 May 2016.</p> <p>SRO training delivered to key senior staff in Police Scotland in March and October 2016.</p>  | <p>Professional programme management expertise and training has supported the development of effective governance, planning and management of the C3 programme.</p> <p>Opportunities to develop capability and good practice within C3 to support wider Programme Management within Police Scotland.</p> | <b>Discharged<br/>(April 2016)</b>      |
| 8 | <p>Police Scotland should continue development of its Contact, Command and Control (C3) leadership and governance arrangements in order to ensure clear delineation and accountability between the C3IR project and 'business as usual'.</p> <p>[See paragraph 128 of our Final Report for further background to this recommendation and improvement required].</p>                        | <p>Revised governance structures were implemented for both programme/projects and business as usual.</p>   | <p>Senior staff have clarity over their operational and programme delivery roles.</p> <p>Governance and accountability is clear for both programme and Business as Usual.</p>  | <b>Discharged<br/>(April 2016)</b>      |
| 9 | <p>Police Scotland and the Scottish Police Authority should urgently review and strengthen their overall approach to programme governance and establish transparent processes for commissioning independent quality assurance reviews for critical stages of all major projects. This should initially focus on improved governance and scrutiny over the C3IR</p>                         | <p>Police Scotland has undertaken a review of programme and project governance and plans to implement a four stage model of assurance (including Gateway Reviews) and invest further in portfolio management skills.</p> <p>The review will implement new internal governance structures and processes which will further strengthen governance of major</p> | <p>A clear way forward has been identified to strengthen programme and project governance in the future.</p> <p>The role of SPA members has been strengthened in the scrutiny of major change programmes.</p>  | <b>Partial Discharge<br/>(Sep 2016)</b> |



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|    | <p>project and independent quality assurance over Stages 5, 6 and 7.</p> <p>[See paragraphs 129-132 of our Final Report for further background to this recommendation and the improvement required].</p>  | <p>programmes and projects.</p> <p>The formation of the SPA C3 Governance and Assurance Group has significantly improved oversight of C3 progress and is considered as a good practice model by HMICS. Similarly the development of quality assurance plans and products for every stage of the programme are also commended.</p> <p><i>This recommendation cannot be discharged until the implementation of the new corporate Governance and Assurance Model and the Corporate Governance Framework - estimated end of March 2017.</i></p> | <p>Quality assurance is now core to the change approach in C3.</p>   |   |
| 10 | <p>Police Scotland should continue to review its risk management process within C3 Division including a review of existing C3IR project and corporate risks. This should also include the development of a separate 'business as usual' risk register.</p> <p>[See paragraphs 133-137 of our Final Report for further background to this recommendation and the improvement required].</p>                      | <p>Risk registers have been developed for both business as usual and programme/projects. These are regularly reviewed and actively discussed.</p>   | <p>Risk management is now an effective governance tool in use within both the C3 programme and BAU</p>       | <p><b>Discharged<br/>(April 2016)</b></p>           |
| 11 | <p>Police Scotland should strengthen its commitment towards programme and project management and the management of cultural change. It should mainstream its improvement approach into existing project and 'business as usual' planning and review its use of Gold Groups.</p> <p>[See paragraphs 138-148 of our Final Report for further background to this recommendation and the improvement required].</p> | <p>Police Scotland has undertaken a review of programme and project governance. It plans to implement a four stage model of assurance (including Gateway Reviews) and invest further in portfolio management skills.</p> <p>Police Scotland has also developed a draft Corporate Improvement Framework which still requires further development and formal adoption.</p> <p>Wider organisational development work including leadership development, staff survey and staff engagement in improvement will be further</p>                    | <p>A clear way forward has been identified to strengthen programme and project governance in the future.</p> | <p><b>Partial Discharge<br/>(November 2016)</b></p> |



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|    |   | <p>developed in order to support the management of cultural change. These are not C3-specific actions and require the improvement to be demonstrated across Police Scotland.</p> <p>As of November 2016, the review of Gold Groups, although initiated, <b><u>has not yet completed</u></b>.</p> <p><i>This recommendation cannot be discharged until the adoption of an approved Corporate Improvement Framework and the completion of a review of the use of Gold Groups.</i></p>  |   |  |
| 12 | <p>Police Scotland should develop a workforce planning model which supports the C3 strategic vision and provides an evidence based assessment of required staffing levels.</p> <p>[See paragraphs 156-187 of our Final Report for further background to this recommendation and the improvement required].</p>  | <p>C3 have secured independent assurance from external consultants on its revised workforce planning model and the recommended staffing levels were agreed by the Chief Constable and Senior Leadership board on 19 October 2016. A further revision of staffing numbers was also undertaken over the festive period to reflect a reduction in average call handling times attributed to introduction of the PSSC and the ASPIRE system upgrade.</p> <p>HMICS views this model as good practice. This model will inform the staffing levels required to be in place at the point of key milestones of the programme (i.e. Dundee in December 2016, Aberdeen in March 2017 and Inverness in June 2017).</p> | <p>A validated workforce planning model is now in place to accurately predict required staffing levels in C3.</p> <p>This model can be refined on the basis of experience and any revised operating model to inform future staffing levels.</p> | <p><b>Discharged<br/>(November 2016)</b></p> |
| 13 | <p>Police Scotland should review the use of staff at the Information Resources Unit for call handling to ensure that effective support and training are in place to maintain skills, awareness and understanding.</p> <p>[See paragraphs 188-189 of our Final Report for further background to this recommendation and the improvement required].</p> | <p>Staff in the Information Resources Unit, Pinnacle House, Glasgow are no longer part of the C3 operational model.</p>  | <p>Staff have increased clarity over their core role.</p> <p>Reduce risk of non-C3 staff being involved in call handling.</p>   | <p><b>Discharged<br/>(April 2016)</b></p>    |



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|    | required].   |  |  |   |
| 14 | <p>Police Scotland should develop a training strategy for C3 Division which is supported by an appropriately skilled and resourced single national training unit.</p> <p>[See paragraphs 190-207 of our Final Report for further background to this recommendation and the improvement required].</p>  | <p>C3 has developed an outline training strategy and delivery programme including induction courses and follow-up training in the 'Academy'.</p> <p>The C3 Training Unit is still under review and requires to be permanently established with suitable facilities and resources.</p> <p>Training also requires to be effectively linked with Continuous Professional Development (CPD) and Personal Development Conversations (PDC) and ongoing cultural change work. Implementation of these processes is now in progress.</p> <p><i>This recommendation cannot be discharged until the CPD/PDC process and documentation are implemented across C3.</i></p> | <p>Consistent training is available to all staff.</p> <p>Individual training and development is aligned to organisational needs through the CPD/PDC process.</p>       | <p><b>Partial Discharge<br/>(November 2016)</b></p> |
| 15 | <p>Police Scotland should further develop its approach to communication and engagement for the C3IR project and include this as a specific workstream with key deliverables within its implementation plans for Stages 5, 6 and 7.</p> <p>[See paragraphs 208-226 of our Final Report for further background to this recommendation and the improvement required].</p> | <p>Police Scotland has developed a strategy, plan and approach to improve stakeholder engagement. There is ongoing engagement with internal and external stakeholders in the North as part of a programme approach. Engagement with staff has developed well with the use of briefing screens, face to face briefing sessions, focus groups, intranet content and regular electronic briefing.</p>   | <p>Communication and engagement has improved.</p>  | <p><b>Discharged<br/>(May 2016)</b></p>             |
| 16 | <p>Police Scotland should review the use of ad hoc 'scribble pads' by service advisors within C3 Division and provide definitive guidance on their use, issue and proportionate supervision.</p> <p>[See paragraphs 252-253 of our Final Report for further background to this recommendation and the improvement required].</p>                                       | <p>A system of notebook issue has been implemented and came into operational use within all centres between March and July 2016. Supervisory checks and guidance have now also been implemented to ensure the new process is maintained.</p> <p>C3 has introduced procedures to track and audit the practical operation of these new processes, including the frequency of supervisory checks.</p>   | <p>Staff and supervisors are now clear on the role and use of scribble pads.</p> <p>Reduced risk of incidents not being fully recorded and actioned on C3 systems.</p> | <p><b>Discharged<br/>(Jun-Oct 2016)</b></p>         |





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| 17 | <p>Police Scotland should ensure that the new suite of integrated technologies procured under Stage 7 of the C3IR project includes a detailed independently assured specification, which supports streamlined national processes, improves compliance and reduces the risk of staff bypassing critical systems. These new systems must also support robust quality assurance processes and audit.</p> <p>[See paragraphs 254-257 of our Final Report for further background to this recommendation and the improvement required].</p> | <p>This stage of the original project was cancelled. However C3 has pursued stabilisation and upgrade of existing ICT systems as well as implementing key national supporting infrastructure.</p> <p>Assurance has been provided to the effect that existing CRM and C3 systems are suitable in the short to medium term (three to five years). However the telephony platform and the ICCS although stable, require upgrade and business cases are in preparation.</p> <p>System bypasses have reduced significantly and are regularly monitored with staff to ensure that ICT systems are used effectively to record all details of a call.</p> | <p>ICT systems and infrastructure have been upgraded and are now stable.</p> <p>A plan for future retention and investment in ICT systems is in place.</p> <p>Reporting and management action on system bypasses reduces the risk of incidents not being fully recorded and actioned on C3 systems.</p> | <p><b>Discharged<br/>(November 2016)</b></p> |
| 18 | <p>Police Scotland and the Scottish Police Authority should implement strengthened ICT governance and independent quality assurance reviews for key deliverables within Stages 5, 6 and 7 of the C3IR project.</p> <p>[See paragraphs 258-261 of our Final Report for further background to this recommendation and the improvement required].</p>  | <p>A weekly C3 ICT Governance Group is now in place and risks are actively monitored. Critical ICT products are embedded within the programme quality assurance approach.</p> <p>Independent assurance work has already taken place, with Gateway Reviews scheduled.</p> <p>An Expert Reference Group has also been established and meets regularly.</p>  | <p>ICT governance has improved.</p> <p>Independent assurance is being used to ensure that all critical ICT products are fit for purpose.</p>  | <p><b>Discharged<br/>(May 2016)</b></p>      |
| 19 | <p>Police Scotland should engage with the Scottish Government, Scottish Fire and Rescue Service and the Scottish Ambulance Service to explore the feasibility and joint development of a bespoke emergency services address gazetteer for Scotland.</p> <p>[See paragraphs 290-292 of our Final Report for further background to this recommendation and the improvement required].</p>   | <p>Police Scotland has been involved in an initial meeting with Scottish Government, Improvement Service/One Scotland Gazetteer, Scottish Fire and Rescue Service and NHS/Scottish Ambulance Service to discuss potential options for further development. All agencies currently have existing software applications linked to specific gazetteers and will consider a single version in their future planning.</p> <p>Police Scotland is continuing to work with the</p>  | <p>Cross sector discussions have now commenced on a shared gazetteer specifically for emergency services.</p>   | <p><b>Discharged<br/>(April 2016)</b></p>    |





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|    | required].   | Improvement Service and its system supplier to improve the data quality and search capabilities of the current gazetteer. C3 has also met with the 32 Council gazetteer custodians to discuss policing business requirements.   |   |   |
| 20 | <p>Police Scotland should implement a robust information audit approach which should include an immediate review of data quality and information security. Functionality and accuracy of the gazetteer and internal directory should be addressed as a priority.</p> <p>[See paragraphs 293-297 of our Final Report for further background to this recommendation and the improvement required].</p>                                   | <p>C3 has made limited progress in this area with the roles of the STORM team and gazetteer team now involving key data maintenance processes.</p> <p><i>This recommendation cannot be discharged until C3 implements its quality assurance framework (Recommendation 25) and fully documents its data and records maintenance/management processes.</i></p> <p><i>Processes to ensure the effective security control of login allocation and applications access must also be in place.</i></p>          | New data maintenance processes have been introduced to improve data quality and system performance.   | <b>Open</b>                                 |
| 21 | <p>Police Scotland should continue to progress the development of a single suite of business continuity plans for C3 Division, replacing remaining legacy site plans.</p> <p>[See paragraphs 298-304 of our Final Report for further background to this recommendation and the improvement required].</p>  | <p>C3 has developed new consolidated Business Continuity Plans, secured the agreement of the corporate BCP advisor and provided a testing/exercise schedule.</p> <p>Business continuity events and system downtime are monitored on an ongoing basis by C3 Division.</p>  | <p>Business Continuity Plans are in place and regularly tested.</p> <p>Maintain a high level of system and service availability to improve customer service.</p>  | <b>Discharged<br/>(November 2016)</b>       |
| 22 | <p>Police Scotland should improve financial management and reporting for the C3IR project. The Scottish Police Authority should consider the level of scrutiny and due diligence applied to change project budgets and projected financial benefits.</p> <p>Identification of explicit savings against project costs (both revenue and capital) should be regularly monitored as part of business case review and overall benefits</p> | <p>Police Scotland has reviewed and changed its approach to benefits realisation within the C3IR change programme to better reflect latest industry standards and best practice. A new benefits realisation plan provides structure and definition to the benefits expected. A benefits dependency network has also been developed within C3.</p> <p>Improved financial reporting for the C3IR change programme is in place which more transparently separates programme costs from those that relate</p> | <p>A clear approach to identifying and measuring benefits is now in place.</p> <p>More transparency over C3 spending, savings and costs.</p> <p>Increased transparency and improved financial governance over wider change programme budgets.</p> | <b>Partial Discharge<br/>(October 2016)</b> |



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|    | <p>reporting.</p> <p>[See paragraphs 309-318 of our Final Report for further background to this recommendation and the improvement required].</p>   | <p>to business as usual.</p> <p>While positive progress has been made in terms of the C3IR change programme, there is more work required to embed this into the wider transformation programme and improve financial governance within Police Scotland and the SPA. Opportunities may exist to include this improvement within the implementation of the 2026 Strategy and SPA Governance Review.</p> <p><i>The recommendation cannot be discharged until the SPA can demonstrate effective scrutiny and due diligence is being applied to change programme/project budgets and projected financial benefits. Evidence is required in relation to the monitoring of explicit savings against programme/project costs (both revenue and capital as part of business case review and overall benefits reporting).</i></p> |  |   |
| 23 | <p>Police Scotland should define and document its key processes within C3 Division and update its standard operating procedures (SOPs). This should be supported with immediate investment in process training and guidance for all existing and new staff.</p> <p>[See paragraphs 319-331 of our Final Report for further background to this recommendation and the improvement required].</p> | <p>C3 continue to work on refining and consolidating SOPs. There has been engagement with staff and discussion at the C3 Operations Board. Similarly some work has also been progressed in terms of implementing standard processes across all centres which are reflected in training courses.</p> <p><i>This recommendation cannot be discharged until a fully revised set of SOPs and accompanying set of standardised processes is produced and implemented.</i></p>  | <p>Standardised procedures ensuring equality and consistency of provision also providing clarity to staff on roles and responsibilities.</p> | <p><b>Partial Discharge (November 2016)</b></p> |
| 24 | <p>Police Scotland should adopt a more formalised risk and vulnerability assessment model for service advisors, reflecting this in both general and specialised awareness training.</p> <p>[See paragraphs 332-343 of our Final</p>   | <p>C3 have implemented new risk and vulnerability training for all members of staff. A post-training survey has given some indication of added value to staff confidence and understanding of the more formalised approach, although more work on evaluation is required to test whether there has been an impact on the</p>  | <p>Enhanced assessment allowing more refined grading and prioritisation of calls and appropriate response.</p>                               | <p><b>Partial Discharge (November 2016)</b></p> |



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|    | Report for further background to this recommendation and the improvement required].   | <p>working practices of service advisors.</p> <p>In addition Police Scotland is now considering implementation of the THRIVE model of assessment used in the majority of forces in England and Wales.</p> <p><i>This recommendation cannot be discharged until Police Scotland provide detailed proposals on their implementation of THRIVE and specifically how this will be implemented within C3 Division.</i></p>   |  |  |
| 25 | <p>Police Scotland should establish a Quality Assurance Framework as soon as possible. This should include regular call audits undertaken by the Quality Assurance Unit and the results shared with the Scottish Police Authority and local policing scrutiny committees.</p> <p>[See paragraphs 359-370 of our Final Report for further background to this recommendation and the improvement required].</p> | <p>Work is still ongoing on the development of the Quality Assurance Framework. The establishment of a Quality Assurance Unit (QAU) was presented at the SPA HR Committee on 1 December 2016 and the preferred option was approved for progression to consultation. A follow-up workshop involving representatives of all C3 business areas to discuss roles/responsibilities has now also taken place.</p> <p>Current supervisory checks are documented within existing SOPs and included in new supervisor training courses and guidance materials.</p> <p><i>This recommendation cannot be discharged until the development and implementation of a documented Quality Assurance Framework, aligned to the wider Police Scotland Corporate Assurance Framework, producing regular assurance and performance information.</i></p> | <p>Improving the quality of call handling processes, improving quality of service to public, increasing capability and capacity of staff, increasing compliance with key processes and reducing risk of system failure.</p> <p>Supervisory checks.</p> | <b>Partial Discharge (November 2016)</b> |
| 26 | <p>Police Scotland should promote an improvement culture where staff are encouraged to where these can be recorded, assessed and any improvement identified and implemented.</p> <p>[See paragraphs 371 of our Final Report</p>   | <p>A documented C3 Notable Incident Process was implemented on 27 April 2016. Notable incidents are recorded and monitored to identify learning.</p> <p>Notable incidents are considered alongside analysis of risk, complaints and other improvement areas by senior management, and</p>   | <p>Improved recording and transparency allowing analysis and learning to take place, ultimately improving service.</p>   | <b>Discharged (May-October 2016)</b>     |



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|    | for further background to this recommendation and the improvement required].   | provide an enhanced approach to learning across the division. The process encourages all staff to report potential issues, which supports development on an individual basis but also in identifying common issues.<br>HMICS has reviewed the notable incident process, as well as each of the notable incidents recorded between April and November 2016.<br><br>HMICS has tested the awareness and usage of processes with staff, supervisors etc.  |   |  |
| 27 | Police Scotland should ensure there is a clear and consistent vision for the role, responsibilities and resourcing of Public Assistance Desks (PADs).<br><br>[See paragraphs 372-376 of our Final Report for further background to this recommendation and the improvement required].  | PADs continue to perform different functions and roles, with different resourcing models across the country. This remains appropriate until further stabilisation of the C3 model takes place and single national systems are implemented to support crime management. Opportunities may exist to develop the role of PADs in accordance with the refreshed vision (Recommendation 1) and the development of the 2026 strategy.<br><br><i>This recommendation cannot be discharged until there is an approved business case and/or roadmap for PAD stabilisation and development.</i> | Improved service at first point of contact.<br><br>Reduction in demands on frontline policing.                    | <b>Open</b>                              |
| 28 | Police Scotland should ensure that any changes impacting on the Service Overview function are fully risk assessed and included with the appropriate governance for Stages 5 and 6 of the C3IR project.<br><br>[See paragraphs 377-381 of our Final Report for further background to this recommendation and the improvement required]. | C3 have confirmed implementation of its original Service Overview model (there are three service overviews based in North, East and West with national overview based in West).   | Establishment of three regional service overviews improves co-ordination of local and national major incidents.   | <b>Discharged (April 2016)</b>           |
| 29 | Police Scotland should include a specific workstream within its Stage 5 and 6 plans of the C3IR project to co-ordinate the collation and transfer of all major incident  | A group has been established with OSD to support a national approach to Major Incident plans, converting existing major incident and emergency response plans into a single format on   | This ensures that the policing response to a wide range of incident types is consistent and accessible across the | <b>Partial Discharge (November 2016)</b> |



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|    | <p>plans onto a single system and embed processes for their ongoing management. This should also include training for staff in their use.</p> <p>[See paragraphs 382-383 of our Final Report for further background to this recommendation and the improvement required].</p>                    | <p>the national STORM Unity system.</p> <p>This work commenced with the conversion of Highlands and Islands Division emergency plans into the new format in time for the introduction of STORM Unity in Dundee.</p> <p>North East Division plans will follow and it is anticipated that this will allow the creation of a wide range of generic STORM action plans which can be rolled out nationally as these become available. Awareness sessions for ACR staff in Dundee have already taken place.</p> <p><i>This recommendation cannot be discharged until an implementation programme has been produced for the co-ordination and maintenance of all major incident plans and communication and training is in place for staff.</i></p> | <p>country.</p>   |  |
| 30 | <p>Police Scotland should ensure there is a clear and consistent vision for the role, responsibilities and resourcing of the National Database Enquiry Unit.</p> <p>[See paragraphs 384-390 of our Final Report for further background to this recommendation and the improvement required].</p> | <p>Provision of database checks is an essential service for frontline officers and other areas of policing to assess risk and must be readily available.</p> <p>C3 brought a revised business case to the Programme Board at the end of December 2016 to establish the NDEU. ICT costs have now reduced and a two centre model is being adopted with Inverness as the main site and Govan as a secondary site for resilience.</p>  | <p>Provision of a one-stop dedicated 24/7/365 service enhancing service delivery.</p> | <p><b>Discharged<br/>(December 2016)</b></p> |

## Appendix 2 – Review of Notable Incidents

### Summary

HMICS has reviewed the notable incident process introduced by C3 Division in response to Recommendation 26 of our call handling review. Overall, we found the notable incident process was working well and appeared to add value by supporting learning and improvement within C3 Division. We have therefore discharged Recommendation 26. However, we have also identified aspects of the notable incident process which could be further developed and improved. These are highlighted in blue italics in this Appendix.

### Aim

1. The aim of our review was to assess the notable incident process introduced by Police Scotland's Contact, Command and Control (C3) Division in response to Recommendation 26 of the HMICS call handling review.<sup>37</sup>


### Context

2. In 2015, HMICS carried out a review of police call handling. The review resulted in 30 recommendations. Recommendation 26 stated that, 'Police Scotland should promote an improvement culture where staff are encouraged to report adverse incidents or 'near misses' and introduce processes as soon as possible where these can be recorded, assessed and any improvement identified and implemented.'
3. In response to this recommendation, C3 Division introduced a notable incident process in April 2016. Notable incidents were defined as, 'any incident where the effectiveness of the C3 Division response is likely to have a significant impact on the reputation of the division, Police Scotland or our partners and from which learning could potentially be obtained as a result of the manner in which it was dealt with.'
4. The scope of notable incidents was extended beyond the adverse incidents and near misses mentioned by HMICS in our recommendation, to include incidents of notable good practice from which learning could also be shared.
5. Notable incidents may be identified via a range of sources, for example, self-referral by an officer or member of police staff, by a supervisor, or as a result of a complaint. Once identified, a Notable Incident Report is submitted to the C3 Divisional Co-ordination Unit (DCU) where it is logged on the Notable Incident Spreadsheet.
6. The DCU informs the C3 Operations Superintendent and the Service Delivery Lead of the notable incident. Each week, notable incidents are discussed at the Friday grip meeting<sup>38</sup> and appropriate next steps are agreed. The Operations Superintendent will decide whether a structured debrief is required. Next steps may include a review to

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<sup>37</sup> HMICS, *Independent Assurance Review: Police Scotland – Call Handling Final Report* (November 2015).

<sup>38</sup> Notable incidents requiring urgent escalation are immediately brought to the attention of the senior officer or staff member on duty, with the standard process (including completion of the Notable Incident Report, submission to DCU etc) followed retrospectively.



identify learning points which are disseminated as appropriate (e.g. to all staff, to a particular individual, included in training etc.).

7. Updates are provided to the DCU following the grip meeting and following any review at which learning points are identified or disseminated. The DCU records these updates on the spreadsheet and identifies any common themes arising from all notable incidents.


## Methodology

8. We reviewed each notable incident that had been recorded by C3 Division between the introduction of the process in April 2016 and the time of our review in November 2016. There were 98 such incidents. Thirty six of the 98 notable incidents arose from calls made to 999. This represented 0.011% of all 999 calls received by Police Scotland between April and November 2016. Fifty two of the 98 notable incidents arose from calls made to the 101 non-emergency number. This represented 0.004% of all calls to 101 during the same period. The remaining notable incidents arose from email contacts or from direct contact via partner agencies such as the Scottish Ambulance Service.
9. The review of each incident involved examining the Notable Incident Report and the Notable Incident spreadsheet, as well as any other evidence we deemed necessary to gain an understanding of the circumstances of the incident and its outcome.
10. For each incident, we checked whether:
  - the Notable Incident Report had been completed with sufficient information
  - the incident had been managed according to the notable incident process
  - there had been appropriate supervisory input
  - there had been appropriate senior management oversight of the notable incident
  - the notable incident had been managed in a timely manner
  - learning had been identified as a result of the incident
  - the learning was appropriate
  - the learning was organisational or was for an individual
  - the learning had been implemented
  - the learning was the same or similar to that from another notable incident
  - the learning from each incident had been appropriately coded to facilitate analysis of all notable incidents
  - the incident reached the threshold for referral to the Police Investigations and Review Commissioner.

## Findings

11. Overall, we found that the notable incident process was working well and appeared to add value by supporting learning and improvement within C3 Division. The process has also matured since its introduction. Our findings are intended to support C3 Division to further develop and continuously improve the process.
12. The majority of notable incidents involved an error or errors by a service adviser and/or controller working in C3 Division. In a few cases, errors were also made by a person working in another Police Scotland business area (such as a local policing division). 12 of the 98 incidents (12%) contained no errors and were examples of positive practice from which learning could be identified and shared.




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13. Collectively, the notable incidents highlight the nature and impact of failure demand on the service (see Recommendation 1 of the HMICS call handling review).
  14. There are a few notable incidents that provide evidence of the value of the telephone confirmation process when transferring incidents to other ACRs.

### The Notable Incident Report

15. The majority of the Notable Incident Reports contained sufficient information to allow us to understand the circumstances of the incident, the learning to be gleaned from the incident and how this learning was to be implemented. However, *there were some cases where the information could have been clearer or where additional information would have been helpful.*
16. In some cases, errors did not affect or had minimal effect on the policing service delivered to the public because the errors were quickly identified and rectified. In other cases, the effect of the error on the quality of the policing service delivered was not clear. *It may be helpful to routinely capture information about the outcome of the incident,* particularly where an error results in significant additional demand on the service (failure demand). This will reinforce the need to 'get it right first time', and to provide a quality, thorough and efficient service, rather than the quickest service.
17. Many, but not all, reports provided contextual information about personnel involved in the notable incident, such as their level of experience. *This helped to put their actions into context, and may be an indicator of the quality of initial training, or indicate that refresher training is required for experienced staff.*


### The Notable Incident Process

18. Notable incidents were generally managed according to the notable incident process. Most incidents were submitted by supervisors with the occasional self-referral or reporting by another route. Supervisory input was mostly objective and appropriate, although on occasion appeared overly defensive of a member of staff.
19. Incidents were submitted from around 60 different people, suggesting there is fairly widespread awareness of and engagement in the process across C3 Division. The majority had submitted only one Notable Incident Report, while just four supervisors were responsible for submitting more than a quarter of all reports. This may be because they have engaged well with the process and value it, and/or because their role means notable incidents are more likely to come to their attention. Comparatively few incidents had been submitted by service centres or ACRs in the North which may suggest a need to improve awareness of and engagement with the process in that area. *The division should continue to monitor the source of reports to help check awareness of and engagement with the notable incident process among all its personnel. The division should also use its quality assurance and complaints processes to identify incidents which should have been submitted as a notable incident but were not.* This may increase the number of notable incidents, but this should be seen as a positive indicator of confidence and engagement in the process, rather than simply an increase in notable incidents. *The division may also wish to reinforce the rationale for the process and its resulting benefits with supervisors, particularly in light of recent media coverage.*

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20. Senior managers appeared to endorse and add to learning outcomes, although *there may be scope for taking a more strategic overview of all notable incidents* (see Appendix 2 - paragraph 26). We discussed the process with a senior officer, including the possibility that *senior officers may wish to review incidents at a later stage in the process, once learning has been identified and an implementation plan proposed* (notwithstanding incidents that may require urgent escalation).
  21. Very few incidents resulted in a structured debrief. We felt *there may be an opportunity to use this process more often, and to include representatives of other business areas or partner agencies*. This may generate increased ownership of the learning from an incident from all involved, and result in notable incidents being resolved more quickly (i.e. the learning is identified and implemented). Even where structured debriefs are held, there is little information about the debrief and its outcome recorded on either the Notable Incident Process or spreadsheet.
  22. We checked that each incident had been progressed and concluded in a timely manner. We found that while learning was often identified and implemented immediately (particularly in respect of individual errors) and the incident *appeared* to have been resolved, the incident had not been recorded as resolved or closed. A number had remained 'open' for months, suggesting that some further action was required. Many that remained open for a significant period of time were only closed in the few weeks prior to our review. This suggests there has not been sufficient administrative grip of the process, or at least that it has been inconsistent. Leaving incidents open when they have in fact been resolved risks masking those incidents that genuinely require further action. *C3 Division should reconsider its process for closing notable incidents and could, for example, review all notable incidents with outstanding actions at a senior management team meetings.*
  23. All notable incidents are recorded on a Notable Incident Spreadsheet, designed to monitor the progress of the incident through the notable incident process, and to capture thematic learning. In the weeks prior to our review, the spreadsheet was redesigned and all previous incidents were transferred to the new spreadsheet. Mistakes have occurred in the transfer process with some updates relating to the wrong incident (likely a cut and paste error). This is disappointing and *C3 Division should review the spreadsheet to ensure its accuracy*. The new spreadsheet more concisely captures the relevant issues, including the learning from the incident, the outcome, and the themes underpinning each incident.

## Learning

24. The notable incident process has resulted in learning being identified effectively on an incident-by-incident basis. While this learning is often for the individuals involved, there are also cases where the division sought to disseminate learning more widely, or adapted a process to support improvement.
25. While the learning is appropriately identified in most cases, there is occasionally additional learning that has been missed, for example, where the Notable Incident Report has been submitted by a service adviser's supervisor, the report focuses on an error made by the service adviser albeit there was also an error made by a controller in respect of the same incident. At times, such additional errors can be missed, or receive insufficient focus. Similarly, in some incidents, the errors go beyond C3 Division. *It is essential that learning is identified by the Operations Superintendent and*



*implemented for all aspects of the incident and for all relevant business areas across Police Scotland.*

26. There is some evidence of learning being identified at a strategic level, but it is more limited. To facilitate strategic analysis of the notable incidents, it is essential that recurring errors are identified and effectively coded (themed). Early attempts at coding (on the first version of the spreadsheet) were haphazard, but have improved significantly on the redesigned spreadsheet. *There is scope to improve the coding even further in two key ways:*
- there are incidents where the core issue was a failure to focus on risk or vulnerability but they have been coded as something else, such as incorrect process. In our view, the failure to focus on vulnerability resulted in the incorrect application of a process
  - *consideration should be given to coding primary and secondary issues.* For example, in the above example, the failure to focus on vulnerability would be the primary issue, and the incorrect application of process would be the secondary issue.
27. Improved coding would allow for more informed analysis and identification of recurring problems which may in turn inform training plans, targeting of quality assurance processes, etc. At the time of our review, 20% of notable incidents were coded as involving a failure to focus on vulnerability. If coding was to improve, this theme would feature even more heavily and, we believe, may be the most frequently occurring theme.
28. Many notable incidents were attributed to individual error and were resolved by providing feedback or guidance to the person concerned. However, some of these individual errors recur and *consideration should be given to the stage at which recurring individual errors may require organisational learning.* For example, there were numerous examples (23% of all notable incidents) of service advisers selecting the wrong locus, with each being attributed to individual error. This may benefit from a wider analysis of why this issue recurs e.g. is there a training or system-related reason? Similarly, filter monitoring appeared to be a recurring theme. *The division may wish to consider a learning circle approach to recurring issues such as these.*
29. While notable incidents involving good practice may generate learning as much as those in which errors are made, in the majority of these positive incidents, the learning was not clearly identified. Instead, the incident report tended to focus on providing positive feedback to the individuals concerned. While such feedback is welcomed, the notable incident process is designed to identify and implement learning. *If no learning can be established, the incident should be excluded from the notable incident process.*
30. The notable incident process will work most effectively where it operates in a culture of learning and improvement rather than blame. However, *consideration should be given to the intersection of the process with individual performance management.* We saw little evidence of this in the notable incidents we reviewed (albeit it may have been considered outwith the process, or may not have been appropriate for the incidents we reviewed). One service adviser was responsible for three notable incidents and was involved in a fourth. He was given feedback regarding each incident, and after the fourth (which was wrongly recorded as being only the third), consideration was being given to an improvement plan.



## PIRC Enquiries

31. Three<sup>39</sup> notable incidents were subject to enquiry by PIRC. We identified two further incidents where the information available suggested a PIRC enquiry may have been appropriate. These incidents were discussed with C3 Division which supplied additional information to show that referral had been considered, but that the criteria for referral to PIRC had not been met.

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<sup>39</sup> This was initially shown in the online version of our report uploaded on 24.01.2017 as four notable incidents and was changed on 25.01.2017 to three as a result of factual accuracy checking.

## Appendix 3 – Glossary

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|                                    |  |
|------------------------------------|--|
| ACC                                | Assistant Chief Constable  |
| ACR                                | Area Control Room. Formerly a Force Control Room. Responsible for the command and control of incidents within its own geographical control area.   |
| AHT                                | Average call Handling Time   |
| ASPIRE                             | Police Scotland CRM ICT system   |
| BAU                                | Business as usual  |
| BCP                                | Business continuity planning   |
| C3 Division                        | Contact, Command and Control Division of Police Scotland   |
| C3IR                               | Contact, Command and Control Integration and Remodelling change programme  |
| Contact, Command and Control or C3 | Common term used to describe the combined functions of contact with the public (call taking or front office counters), deploying resources to attend incidents and providing a co-ordination function to those resources.      |
| Controller                         | Common term used to describe a Dispatcher or Controller of incidents.  |
| Corporate governance               | The systems and structures used by an organisation to direct and control that organisation. This includes ethical behaviours and principles of openness, accountability and integrity.   |
| CRM                                | Customer Relationship Management System  |
| DCC                                | Deputy Chief Constable   |
| DCU                                | Divisional Co-ordination Unit  |
| Demand management                  | Understanding demand by type and volume over time allowing prediction of resources required to meet a pre-determined level of response at the required level of quality to a forecasted level of calls.                        |
| Discontinued call                  | A telephone call which has been terminated (hung up) by the caller.  |
| Dispatch                           | Sending of police officers or resources to a destination   |
| Division                           | Divisional policing areas of Police Scotland, each led by a divisional commander.  |
| Divisional commander               | Chief Superintendent in charge of a division   |
| Failure demand                     | Demand on an organisation caused by 'a failure to do something or do something right for the customer' or 'avoidable contact'  |
| GAAG                               | SPA C3 Governance and Assurance Group  |
| Gold Group                         | Formal command structure known as Gold, Silver and Bronze is sometimes referred to as the strategic, tactical and operational model. Gold Groups are formed to provide strategic leadership in response to a critical incident |
| Grade of service                   | Percentage of calls answered within 10 seconds (for 999 calls) or 40 seconds (for 101 calls)   |
| HMICS                              | Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary in Scotland   |
| i6                                 | Former programme to develop an integrated national police ICT system   |

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|----------------------|--|
| ICCS                 | Provides the voice and data communications is the technology which provides a single touchscreen control to a host of integrated subsystems including radio systems, call handling systems, digital and analogue telephony, CCTV, voice recorders, intercom systems, door locks and alarms |
| ICT                  | Information and Communications Technology  |
| IR                   | Integration and Remodelling  |
| JACC                 | Joint Agency Control Centre  |
| MACC                 | Multi Agency Control Centre  |
| MCAS                 | Managed Call Appointment System  |
| NDEU                 | National Database Enquiry Unit   |
| North/East/West      | Territorial policing areas – the three operational policing areas in Scotland.   |
| Notable incident     | Any incident where the effectiveness of the C3 Division response is likely to have a significant impact on the reputation of the division, Police Scotland or partners and from which learning could potentially be obtained as a result of the manner in which it was dealt with          |
| Overflow             | Calls re-routed after a defined period of no answer e.g. 120 seconds, to another location  |
| OSD                  | Operational Support Division   |
| PAD                  | Public Assistance Desk   |
| PDC                  | Performance and Development Conversation   |
| PIRC                 | Police Investigations and Review Commissioner  |
| PNC                  | Police National Computer   |
| Programme management | Management of a specific set of related projects identified by an organisation that together will deliver some defined objective, or set of objectives, for the organisation.  |
| PSSC                 | Police Scotland Service Centre   |
| QUAT                 | Quality, Utilisation, Attrition, Timeliness – performance framework structure  |
| SAS                  | Scottish Ambulance Service   |
| SCOPE                | Police Scotland Human Resources ICT system   |
| Service Centre       | Common term for a public service centre/contact centre.  |
| Service Overview     | ACR function established in East/West and North to provide oversight and monitoring of strategic force and command area communications and ensuring the effective and efficient direction and deployment of specialist resource  |
| SOP                  | Standard Operating Procedure   |
| SPA                  | Scottish Police Authority  |
| SRO                  | Senior Responsible Owner - designated senior officer responsible for the delivery of the change programme  |
| STORM Unity          | Police Scotland Command and Control ICT system   |
| THRIVE               | Threat, Harm, Risk, Investigation, Vulnerability, Engagement – risk and vulnerability assessment model   |
| VR/ER                | Voluntary Redundancy/Early Retirement  |
| Workforce planning   | The ongoing planning process for the numbers, demographics, locations, working patterns and skills of staff and officers required to meet call demand.   |



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HMICS operates independently of Police Scotland, the Scottish Police Authority and the Scottish Government. Under the Police and Fire Reform (Scotland) Act 2012, our role is to review the state, effectiveness and efficiency of Police Scotland and the Scottish Police Authority. We support improvement in policing by carrying out inspections, making recommendations and highlighting effective practice.

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